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Sichtermann: Slowing the PACE of Recovery: Why Property Assessed Clean Energy

SLOWING THE PACE OF RECOVERY:
WHY PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY
PROGRAMS RISK REPEATING THE
MISTAKES OF THE RECENT FORECLOSURE
CRISIS
I. INTRODUCTION
Since taking office in 2009, President Obama has stressed the need to
retrofit America’s buildings with alternative forms of sustainable
energy.1 Increased reliance on one form of sustainable energy, solar
power, will conserve fossil fuels and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 2
Despite the many attractive benefits, homeowners are reluctant to invest
in solar energy retrofits because of the high upfront cost of installation. 3
To help homeowners overcome these costs, states are experimenting
with different financing methods. 4 Property Assessed Clean Energy
(“PACE”) programs are one financing method that allow local
governments to use special assessment districts to finance these home
installations.5 PACE programs represent the most recent in a long line of
1
See generally MIDDLE CLASS TASK FORCE & COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
RECOVERY THROUGH RETROFIT (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/
documents/Recovery_Through_Retrofit_Final_Report.pdf (describing the White House’s
energy policy).
2
See Energy Kinetics, Sustainability, SYSTEM 2000, http://www.energykinetics.com/
sustainability.shtml (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (explaining how solar energy can benefit the
environment).
3
See Robert C. Barnes, The Promise and Peril of Assembly Bill 811’s Contractual
Assessments, CAL. REAL EST. J., Jan. 26, 2009, at 14 (reporting that “solar energy
systems . . . can cost up to $40,000 per installation”). The average contract in Palm Desert,
California, was $33,000. Id.; see also Progress Report, Reality Check: The Powers That Be, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 2010, at 27 (reporting that despite a fifty percent drop in price,
the costs need to drop an additional twenty-five to fifty percent from current levels before
solar systems will be economical).
4
See Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY,
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/solutioncenter/PrintableVersion/financialproducts/p
ace.html (last visited July 28, 2011) (explaining the advantages and disadvantages of PACE
projects). Supporters also assert that these programs will increase demand for homes and
increase home values. ETHAN N. ELKIND ET AL., SAVING ENERGY: HOW CALIFORNIA CAN
LAUNCH A STATEWIDE RETROFIT PROGRAM FOR EXISTING RESIDENCES AND SMALL
BUSINESSES 14 (May 2010), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Saving_
Energy_May_2010(1).pdf; see also MARK ZIMRING & MERRIAN FULLER, CLEAN ENERGY
FINANCING POLICY BRIEF: ACCELERATING THE PAYMENT OF PACE ASSESSMENTS 3 (May 4,
2010), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/ems/reports/ee-policybrief_050410.pdf (claiming
that “energy savings [from solar panel installation] will offset and, in some cases, exceed
the assessment payments,” thereby reducing the risk of default on the PACE assessment).
5
Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4; see also Cisco DeVries &
Christopher Lynch, How Cool: Changes to Municipal Finance Law Address Global Warming,
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state and local initiatives, but previous programs have only been met
with limited success.6
However, critics have been quick to point out that these programs
have various legal and financial risks that could repeat the financial crisis
of 2008.7 In particular, critics argue that these programs are loans instead
of traditional property assessments. Since they are not assessments,
PACE loans are not entitled to a senior lien position ahead of preexisting
mortgages.8 The resolution of all of these financial and legal challenges
depends on whether PACE programs can be classified as property tax
assessments with senior lien status. In reality, PACE programs are
actually loan programs, not an extension of the special assessment
statutory authority. As such, the tax lien provisions in PACE statutes are
invalid, and PACE programs are not entitled to a senior lien position
ahead of preexisting mortgages.
This Note begins by explaining the history of PACE statutes and the
controversy surrounding them in Part II. 9 Part II also examines the
Create Green Jobs and Promote Energy Independence, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. 1, 1 (2010), available
at http://pacenow.org/documents/Bloomberg%20Law%20Article.pdf (explaining that
such special assessment districts, or “land-secured finance districts,” could “essentially
eliminate upfront cost barriers and spread the cost of energy efficiency improvements over
their useful life”). PACE programs are also known as Voluntary Environmental
Improvement Bonds, Energy Loan Tax Assessment Programs, or Energy
Efficiency/Renewable Energy Contractual Assessment Districts in some states. SANJAY
RANCHOD ET AL., THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROPERTY ASSESSED CLEAN ENERGY (PACE)
PROGRAMS UNDER FEDERAL AND CALIFORNIA LAW 3 (May 28, 2010), available at
http://votesolar.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/PHJW-PACE-White-Paper.pdf
(listing other names).
6
DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4. See generally SHARON STANTON WHITE,
MUNICIPAL BOND FINANCING OF SOLAR ENERGY FACILITIES (1979) (analyzing the possibility
of bond financing for solar energy projects in the late 1970s).
7
See generally Barnes, supra note 3, at 1 (arguing that PACE programs risk creating the
same conditions that led to the Great Recession); David A. Felt, PACE Loans—Another
Subprime Mortgage Crisis?, MKT. SOLUTIONS, June 2010, at 1 (arguing that PACE risks
outweigh benefits). The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission recently concluded that the
2008 financial crisis resulted in part from “shoddy mortgage lending.” Sewell Chan,
Financial Crisis Was Avoidable, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2011, at A1. According to
financial publications, PACE programs represent “a new and potentially devastating shock
to the mortgage securities markets and the financial system.” Felt, supra, at 1. These
programs “threaten to undermine the already battered mortgage market in the United
States.” Id.
8
Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Statement on Certain Energy Retrofit
Loan Programs (July 6, 2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15884/PACE
STMT7610.pdf [hereinafter July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release]. A first mortgage or lien on a
piece of property “has first priority” over subsequent mortgages and liens, so it is senior.
DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS 113 (2004). All
mortgages and liens recorded after this senior mortgage “are called ‘junior’ mortgages.” Id.
9
See infra Part II (chronicling the history of PACE programs and explaining why these
programs are so controversial).
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theory behind tax liens and municipal bond financing and concludes by
examining the specific elements of special assessments. 10 Next, Part III
analyzes PACE statutes and ultimately determines that these statutes are
drastically different from traditional special assessment statutes. 11
Part IV attempts to resolve the controversy between PACE
supporters and the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) by
focusing on Maine’s statute.12 Maine’s statute does not conflict with the
FHFA’s guidelines because it requires PACE programs to impose junior
liens.13 Therefore, states should amend their statutes to model the Maine
statute, while at the same time adopting the Department of Energy’s
(“DOE”) Best Practices Guidelines.14 If states make these changes,
investors will once again support PACE programs.
II. BACKGROUND
Investors have stopped supporting PACE programs and
homeowners have not reaped PACE’s benefits because of the uncertain
tax lien status of PACE statutes. Part II begins with a general overview
of PACE programs before analyzing whether recently enacted PACE
statutes can be classified as valid property assessments.15 Following the
historical discussion of PACE programs, Part II.B introduces various
proposals to resolve the controversy. 16 Part II.C then examines the PACE
statutes, the theory behind municipal bond financing, and tax liens.17
Finally, Part II.D discusses the specific elements of special assessment
districts.18 PACE statutes’ tax lien provisions are at the heart of the
controversy surrounding these programs.

See infra Part II.D (describing the elements for a valid property assessment lien).
See infra Part III (analyzing whether PACE programs conform to the guidelines for
valid property assessments).
12
See infra Part IV (proposing an amended PACE statute).
13
See infra note 44 (explaining that FHFA lending guidelines prohibit property owners
from taking out loans with repayment provisions senior to an existing FHFA loan); see also
infra note 40 (noting that Maine’s statute is the only statute that currently makes PACE
liens junior to preexisting liens).
14
See infra Part IV (proposing a model statute).
15
See infra Part II.A (explaining the theory behind PACE statutes and the reasons why
these statutes were originally codified).
16
See infra Part II.B (explaining the FHFA’s objections to PACE programs).
17
See infra Part II.C (describing the elements of valid property assessments); see also Part
III (analyzing PACE programs and concluding that they do not meet the requirements for a
valid assessment).
18
See infra Part II.D (discussing the legal and financial aspects of tax liens and explaining
why they are crucial to determining whether PACE programs are valid assessments).
10
11
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A. PACE Programs in General
Local governments currently have statutory authority to use special
assessment districts, also known as land-secured finance districts, to
finance a number of public improvements.19 PACE statutes essentially
amend these preexisting municipal financing statutes to allow
municipalities to finance home energy improvements.20 To date, more
than twenty states have enacted PACE statutes in the last three years,
and many more are considering similar statutes.21 Local governments in
California and Colorado have had the most success in implementing
PACE programs.22
Local governments typically issue bonds to raise revenue. 23 Once a
local government raises money through a bond issue, homeowners who

19
See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 53340(e) (West 2010). Such special assessment districts
“are an essential building block of municipal finance . . . used to finance projects including
street paving, parks, open space, water and sewer systems, and street lighting.” DeVries &
Lynch, supra note 5, at 2. Municipalities also use special assessment districts to finance
“seismic improvements, geologic hazard abatement and toxic remediation . . . [and] septic
tank replacement.” Id. at 4. Assessments are also used to finance road improvements,
“bury[] power lines, [and] extend[] public services into neighborhoods.” JASON COUGHLIN
ET AL., CLEAN ENERGY FINANCING POLICY BRIEF: TRANSFERRING PACE ASSESSMENTS UPON
HOME SALE 2 (Apr. 12, 2010), available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/ea/emp/reports/eepolicybrief_041210.pdf.
20
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that states must slightly modify
their special assessment district legislation to allow local governments to finance “energy
efficiency and solar projects on private property”).
21
The following states have enacted PACE legislation: California, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§ 26100 (West Supp. 2011); Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20-606 (2002 & Supp. 2010);
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 189.402 (West 2000); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 36-42-3 (2006 &
Supp. 2011); Illinois, 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-11 (Supp. 2011); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 46-80 (1993); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35A, § 10152 (2010); Maryland, MD. CODE ANN.
art. 24, § 9-1501 (West 2009); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 216C.43 (West 2010); Missouri, MO.
REV. STAT. § 67.2800 (Supp. 2011); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. § 271.010 (2011); New
Hampshire, N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 53-F:1 (2010); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 4-55C-1
(West 2010); New York, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 119-gg (McKinney 2009); North Carolina,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-459 (2009); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5727.75 (West Supp.
2011); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 460.2 (Supp. 2011); Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. § 470
(2009); Texas, TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 376 (West Supp. 2010); Vermont, VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 24, § 1714(3) (2009); Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-958.3 (Supp. 2011); and
Wisconsin, WIS. STAT. § 66.0627 (West 2011).
22
DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 5. All of Berkeley, California’s slots were filled in less
than ten minutes, and Palm Desert, California has funded $7.5 million worth of projects.
Berkeley only made a limited number of slots available to residents and once those slots
were filled, residents could no longer apply for PACE loans. Id. Boulder County, Colorado
has funded 500 projects by selling $10 million worth of bonds. Id.
23
Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4.
While most
municipalities use special assessment bonds to finance their PACE programs, some, such as
Palm Desert, California, have used different sources of funds. Barnes, supra note 3, at 14.
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wish to take part in the PACE program apply for a loan from the local
government.24 After receiving the loan, property owners in the
assessment district repay the cost of the improvement through a senior
This financing method is attractive to
lien on the property.25
homeowners because it allows them to install a solar panel without the
high initial costs.26 Instead of paying for the improvement all at once,
the homeowner makes incremental payments for several years until the
entire cost is paid off.27 Local governments collect payments from
property owners at the same time as property taxes.28 Because PACE
programs are voluntary, the local government only assesses liens on
homeowners who choose to take part in the program. 29 In addition, the
Palm Desert used its general fund to pay for $2.5 million in PACE contracts, “a fiscal
luxury that few cities enjoy today.” Id.
24
Glen Anderson, Financing Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency, LEGISBRIEF, Aug.–
Sept. 2009, at 1, available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/solutioncenter/pdfs/
NCSL_Property_Tax_Financing_Legisbrief.pdf (explaining that “[r]esidents within these
districts then can apply for low-interest loans”).
25
See id. (pointing out that homeowners can repay these loans “through an assessment
on property taxes or added to the utility bill”); Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE)
Programs, supra note 4 (“The property owners that benefit from the improvement repay the
bond through property assessments, which are secured by a property lien and paid as an
addition to the property tax bill.”).
26
Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4. PACE programs allow
homeowners “to install renewable energy equipment or upgrade efficiency at a low
monthly cost.” Anderson, supra note 24, at 1. Additionally, “[t]he work can be completed
with no upfront costs and usually no increase in cost to the owner, [because] the energy
savings should be equal to or greater than loan payments assessed to the property tax.” Id.
at 1–2; see also RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 4 (pointing out that many homeowners do
not make these upgrades because they face prohibitively high upfront costs, and do not see
any economic benefits until later because the “benefits of energy cost savings are
distributed over time”).
27
Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs, supra note 4; see also DeVries & Lynch,
supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that the homeowner “pay[s] back the costs . . . over a fixed
period”).
28
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that homeowners pay for the
improvement “through an addition to their property tax bill”); see also Barnes, supra note 3,
at 1 (explaining that local governments will use liens to secure these “contractual
obligations”); Joel B. Eisen, Can Urban Solar Become a “Disruptive” Technology?: The Case for
Solar Utilities, 24 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 53, 84 (2010) (explaining that these
programs allow property owners to reimburse local governments for the upfront costs by
“adding specified amounts to their property tax bill[]” for a period of years).
29
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that homeowners “only pay
additional property taxes if they ‘opt-in,’ and they only pay for the cost of their project”);
MERRIAN C. FULLER ET AL., GUIDE TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY
FINANCING DISTRICTS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 27 (2009), available at http://rael.berkeley.
edu/sites/default/files/old-site-files/berkeleysolar/HowTo.pdf (explaining that “a
particular parcel of property is not assessed unless that property owner ‘opts-in’ and
applies to participate in the program”); RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 3–4 (stating that
“taxes or assessments may be levied only where the property owner has expressly consented

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 8

268

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

lien runs with the land, meaning that if a homeowner sells the property
before the lien is fully paid, the new homeowner, not the original owner,
will pay the remainder of the lien. 30
These programs are not only beneficial to property owners, but to
cities as well. Cities have used special assessments with senior lien
provisions to finance local improvements for over one hundred years.31
In the 1970s, organizations began looking into financing solar
improvements by issuing municipal bonds. 32
However, PACE
programs, which allow individual property owners to voluntarily opt
into financing districts, are new and innovative. 33 This general overview
to participate in the PACE program”) (emphasis added); Property-Assessed Clean Energy
(PACE) Programs, supra note 4 (clarifying that the liens only attach to property if property
owners “voluntarily choose to attach the cost of their energy improvements to their
property tax bill”).
30
See DEP’T OF ENERGY, GUIDELINES FOR PILOT PACE FINANCING PROGRAMS 1 (2010),
available at http://www1.eere.energy.gov/wip/pdfs/arra_guidelines_for_pilot_pace_
programs.pdf (explaining that “PACE programs attach the obligation to repay . . . to the
property, not to the individual borrower”); Property-Assessed Clean Energy (PACE) Programs,
supra note 4 (“If the property is sold before the end of the repayment period, the new
owner inherits both the remaining repayment obligation and the financed energy
improvements.”). This ensures that the cost of the improvement will be “repaid over the
useful life of the financed improvements, regardless of who owns the property.” DeVries
& Lynch, supra note 5, at 2; see also Anderson, supra note 24, at 1 (noting that since the loan
is repaid through a tax assessment or a surcharge on utility bills, “the benefits and
payments stay with the property”).
31
See generally Guinn v. McReynolds, 170 P. 421 (Cal. 1918) (explaining that tax liens are
senior to other liens); Spring St. Co. v. Los Angeles, 148 P. 217 (Cal. 1915) (explaining that
assessments in general are valid, but the one at issue in the case was invalid since it was not
proportional to the benefits received by the homeowners); German Sav. & Loan Soc’y v.
Ramish, 69 P. 89 (Cal. 1902) (upholding a state statutory senior lien provision to finance
street improvements); People ex rel. Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (N.Y. 1851) (validating a
state statute allowing a municipality to use an assessment to finance street improvements);
RANCHOD ET AL., supra note 5, at 3 (listing types of projects financed through special
assessments and explaining that “[s]uch districts have been a part of municipal finance and
the tax lien structure for more than a century”); Water, Wastewater & Wetlands: Betterments,
MASS. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., http://www.mass.gov/dep/water/betters.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2011) (explaining that homeowners can take part in these programs to finance
septic tank improvements).
32
See generally WHITE, supra note 6, at 2 (listing the types of solar energy improvements
that could be financed through municipal bonds).
33
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 1 (describing the PACE program as “an
innovative municipal finance model”); Nick Timiraos, Fannie and Freddie Resist Loans for
Energy Efficiency, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 25, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052748704534904575132123115802584.html (describing PACE as “a novel
financing mechanism”); see also THE NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL ET AL., WHITE PAPER:
HELPING ACHIEVE ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY AND ENERGY INDEPENDENCE,
IMPROVING HOMEOWNER CASH FLOW AND CREDIT PROFILE, PROTECTING MORTGAGE
LENDERS, AND CREATING JOBS 3 (May 3, 2010) (describing these programs as “innovative
and cost effective”); Todd Woody, Loan Giants Threaten Energy-Efficiency Programs, N.Y.
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applies to most PACE programs, but several state statutes have unique
attributes that make their programs significantly different.
1.

State Statutes

PACE programs are entirely voluntary, but once a homeowner opts
into the program, most statutes allow local governments to impose a
property tax assessment on the property.34 Most statutes require
homeowners to pay this assessment through a lien on the property. 35
Although some proponents claim that these assessments are not loans,
many statutes specifically refer to PACE financing as a loan. 36 Several
PACE statutes allow homeowners to repay this loan through a surcharge
on the homeowner’s utility bill as an alternative to assessments and liens,

TIMES (June 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/01/business/energyenvironment/01solar.html (describing PACE programs as “innovative”); AIA Urges
Congress to Save Clean Energy Bond Program, ARCHINNOVATIONS (July 20, 2010),
http://www.archinnovations.com/news/architecture-practice/aia-urges-congress-to-save
-clean-energy-bond-program/ (listing the many benefits of this innovative tool).
34
See, e.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-1-11 (Supp. 2011) (“A municipality may enter into
voluntary agreements with the owners of property within the municipality to provide for
contractual assessments to finance the installation of distributed generation renewable
energy sources or energy efficiency improvements that are permanently fixed to real
property.”) (emphasis added).
35
See CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5898.30 (West Supp. 2011) (“Assessments levied
pursuant to this chapter . . . shall constitute a lien against the lots . . . of land on which they
are made . . . .”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 30-20-610 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (explaining that the
“[a]ssessment constitutes a lien”); OKLA. STAT. tit. 19, § 460.5(C) (2009) (explaining that
PACE loans “shall constitute a lien”); OR. REV. STAT. § 470.36(2) (2009) (explaining that
once a homeowner takes out a PACE loan, “[t]he department shall record a lien”); TEX.
LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 376.008 (West Supp. 2010) (“An assessment imposed under this
chapter . . . constitutes a lien . . . .”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 3262(c)(2) (2009) (explaining
that when property is sold “future payments [on PACE loans] shall constitute as a lien”).
36
See Brief for Plaintiff, California v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, C10-03084 (filed Jul. 14,
2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1951_final_pace_
complaint_&_exhibits_(stamped).pdf (arguing that in California, PACE financing uses liens
not loans). But see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 10153.4 (2010) (“‘PACE mortgage’
means a mortgage securing a loan made pursuant to a PACE program to fund energy
savings improvements on qualifying property.”) (emphasis added); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 470.500(1) (2009) (“The Director of the State Department of Energy shall administer the
energy efficiency and sustainable technology loan program for the purpose of providing
financing, promotion and technical support . . . .”) (emphasis added); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 15.2-958.3(B) (Supp. 2011) (“Any locality may, by ordinance, authorize contracts to
provide loans for the initial acquisition and installation of clean energy improvements with
free and willing property owners . . . .”) (emphasis added); Eisen, supra note 28, at 86
(describing PACE as more like loans).
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and two statutes even allow for an alternate secondary form of
repayment known as a Loan Loss Reserve Fund (“Reserve Fund”).37
The most significant difference between the various state PACE
statutes is the seniority of the lien: most statutes require the lien to be
senior to all other mortgages and liens, just like property taxes. 38
37
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 470.680(3) (2009) (“An energy efficiency and sustainable
technology loan must provide for repayment through an on-bill financing system
unless . . . the department and the borrower specify the alternative repayment method in
the loan agreement.”); VA. CODE § 15.2-958.3(B) (“The locality may combine the loan
payments required by the contracts with billings for water or sewer charges, real property
tax assessments, or other billings . . . .”). Maine’s statute is more open-ended: “PACE
assessments do not constitute a tax but may be assessed and collected by the trust, a
municipality or an agent designated by the trust or a municipality in any manner allowed
under the PACE program, consistent with applicable laws.” ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A,
§ 10156.1 (2010). North Carolina’s statute provides for repayment through a Revolving
Loan Fund as an alternative method of secondary repayment:
Financing Assistance— A city may establish a revolving loan fund and
a loan loss reserve fund for the purpose of financing or assisting in the
financing of the purchase and installation of distributed generation
renewable energy sources or energy efficiency improvements that are
permanently fixed to residential, commercial, or other real property. A
city may establish other local government energy efficiency and
distributed generation renewable energy source finance programs
funded through federal grants. A city may use State and federal grants
and loans and its general revenue for this financing.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-459.1(b) (2009). Likewise, Hawaii’s statute provides for a reserve
fund:
Reserve funds for payment of improvements. . . . As used in this
section, “reserve fund” means any fund established by a county to
provide security, in addition to any special fund made up of moneys
collected on account of assessments and interest for improvements, for
the payment of principal and interest on bonds issued for such
improvements where moneys in the special fund are insufficient for
this purpose.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 46-81 (1993). The federal grants referenced in the North Carolina statute
can come from a variety of programs. One program in particular, the Community
Development Block Grant (“CDBG”), was championed during the Clinton Administration.
See Patricia E. Salkin, Smart Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a National Land
Use Policy, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 381, 394–95 (2003) (describing the Housing and Urban
Development’s grant program). These grant funds can be used for “construction of public
facilities and improvements, such as water and sewer facilities, streets, neighborhood
centers, and the conversion of school buildings for eligible purposes; and provision of
assistance to profit-motivated businesses to carry out economic development and job
creation or retention activities.” Id. at 395.
38
See, e.g., CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5898.30 (“[T]he collection of assessments [are] in
the same manner and at the same time as the general taxes of the city or county on real
property, and any penalties and remedies in the event of delinquency and default.”); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 30-20-614 (2002 & Supp. 2010) (explaining that installments “shall be [paid at]
the same . . . time[] [as] payment for installments of property taxes”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 518-7.B (West 2010) (“The special assessment shall be . . . collected at the same time and in
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Oregon’s statute departs from the majority position by not specifying the
lien’s seniority.39 Maine’s statute makes the greatest departure from the
majority position because the statute specifically requires the lien to be
subordinate to preexisting mortgages and liens. 40 Many mortgage
industry groups have strongly criticized the majority’s senior lien
position.
2.

How PACE Programs Conflict with Fannie/Freddie Lending
Guidelines

The most vocal opposition to PACE programs has come from the
Government Sponsored Enterprises (“GSEs”): the Federal National
Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”); the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (“Freddie Mac”); and their conservator, the FHFA.41 On
the same manner as property taxes . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 66.0627 (2009) (explaining that the
special assessment may be included as a charge on the resident’s property tax bill); see also
City of Phoenix v. Wayland, 167 P.2d 933, 934 (Ariz. 1946) (explaining that if two taxes or
assessments are collected at the same time, they have the same priority).
39
OR. REV. STAT. § 470.680(2)–(3) (2009).
(2) . . . . The department shall record a lien on the real property
benefited by the loan for those indebtedness amounts that are not
secured by a fixture filing. . . . (3) An energy efficiency and sustainable
technology loan must provide for repayment through an on-bill
financing system unless . . . the department and the borrower specify
the alternative repayment method in the loan agreement.
Id.
40
ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 10156.3-3A (2010).
3. Priority. Except as provided in paragraph A, the priority of a
PACE mortgage created under subsection 2 is determined based on the
date of filing of notice required under subsection 2 and applicable law.
A PACE mortgage is not entitled to any special or senior priority.
A. If a property owner’s PACE assessment payments are
current, upon the refinancing, sale or transfer of the qualifying
property, other than a judicial sale or foreclosure, the PACE
mortgage is junior and subordinate in priority to the first
mortgage used to refinance an existing mortgage or a first
mortgage of a subsequent purchaser or transferee, regardless of
the date of the recording of the refinanced first mortgage or the
first mortgage of the subsequent purchaser or transferee.
Id.
41
See Geof Koss, Cities, Businesses Look for Help in Fight Over ‘PACE’ of Retrofits, CQ
TODAY (Sept. 20, 2010), http://pacenow.org/blog/2010/09/cq-today-cities-businesseslook-for-help-in-fight-over-%E2%80%98pace%E2%80%99-of-retrofits/
(reporting
that
businesses and cities are urging Congress to settle the “dispute with the [FHFA],” which is
hindering PACE programs); Timiraos, supra note 33 (reporting that the GSEs are resisting
PACE programs); Woody, supra note 33 (reporting that the GSEs likely will not accept
loans that have PACE liens). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are the two main “secondary
mortgage market” participants. MARGARET C. JASPER, HOME MORTGAGE LAW PRIMER 8 (3d
ed. 2009). The “secondary [mortgage] market” is a government created market where
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May 5, 2010, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac issued letters warning lenders
that PACE programs violate their lending standards because of the
senior lien provisions.42 In July, the FHFA issued two lender letters
warning Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to avoid taking on loans
associated with PACE programs.43 The FHFA also set out specific
guidelines that required future mortgages in states with PACE programs
to satisfy loan-to-value (“LTV”) limits, approval requirements, increased
debt-to-income ratios, and assurances that mortgages comply with state
and federal laws.44 PACE supporters responded to these criticisms
through a variety of legal means.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase “first mortgages from various lenders [which] frees
the lender’s [sic] finances so that they can make additional loans.” Id. Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac each have unique requirements that must be met before they purchase a
mortgage, but in general their requirements and conditions are very strict. Id. at 7–8. For
another discussion of the secondary mortgage market, see Quintin Johnstone, Land
Transfers: Process and Processors, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 493, 515–16 (1988).
42
See Industry Letter from Freddie Mac to Freddie Mac Seller/Servicers (May 5, 2010),
available
at
http://www.freddiemac.com/sell/guide/bulletins/pdf/iltr050510.pdf
[hereinafter Freddie Mac Letter] (“[R]emind[ing] Seller/Servicers that an energy-related
lien may not be senior to any Mortgage delivered to Freddie Mac.”); Lender Letter LL-201006 from Fannie Mae to All Fannie Mae Single-Family Sellers and Servicers (May 5, 2010),
available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/guides/ssg/annltrs/pdf/2010/ll1006.pdf
[hereinafter Fannie Mae Letter] (advising lenders that “Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform
Security Instruments prohibit loans that have senior lien status to a mortgage”).
43
See July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release, supra note 8 (urging state governments to
reconsider the programs); Press Release from Federal Housing Finance Agency (July 14,
2010), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15963/PACE_ststament_7_14_10.pdf
(proclaiming that the FHFA “will defend vigorously its actions that aim to protect
taxpayers, lenders, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac”) [hereinafter July 14, 2010 FHFA Press
Release]. Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the FHFA are not the only entities concerned about
PACE programs. “The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corp[oration]” are concerned that PACE loans’ “priority status . . . raises safety
and soundness concerns” and that “PACE loans may be made without appropriate
disclosures.” 29 No. 8 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL’Y REP. 34, 35 (2010). Finally, “[t]he
FHFA and OCC also noted the possibility that PACE loans could affect the value of
mortgage-backed securities that are based on mortgages secured by properties in places
where the loans are available. This could affect secondary market participants.” Id.
44
July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release, supra note 8. This letter grandfathered in existing
PACE loans with senior lien provisions, but made clear no new senior PACE loans would
be insured. Id. Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Single-Family Uniform Instrument Form 3005
requires a “[b]orrower [to] promptly discharge any lien which has priority over this
Security Instrument unless Borrower: (a) agrees in writing to the payment of the obligation
secured by the lien in a manner acceptable to Lender.” See Letter from Chris Lynch to
PACE Working Group, available at http://pacenow.org/documents/7a.%20JH%20Lien
%20Issue%20Paper%20CLN.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2011) (reproducing the Uniform
Instrument Form 3005 language).
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B. Efforts to Resolve the Issues Through the DOE, the Courts, and Congress
PACE supporters have attempted to ease the GSEs’ concerns
through executive, judicial, and legislative actions. The DOE released
Best Practices Guidelines, which were designed to ensure that PACE
loans do not impact preexisting mortgage holders.45 Former California
Attorney General Edmund Brown filed a complaint in federal court
seeking declaratory relief against the FHFA, and recently, other parties
have also filed suit in federal court.46 Finally, members of Congress
introduced two bills late in the 110th Congressional Term to resolve the
uncertainty.47
1.

DOE Letter to FHFA and Best Practices Guidelines

The DOE made the first attempt to ease the GSEs’ concerns when it
issued Best Practices Guidelines on May 7, 2010.48 The first section of the
document suggests ways for local governments to structure the
programs to be more efficient for all stakeholders.49 The second section
of the document, addressing “Assessment Underwriting,” suggests
stringent underwriting criteria to “reduce the risk of default.” 50
See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining the DOE’s Best Practices Guidelines).
See infra Part II.B.2 (describing California’s suit against the FHFA).
47
See infra Part II.B.3 (explaining Congressional efforts to resolve the PACE
controversy).
48
See generally DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30 (listing the DOE’s guidelines).
49
See id. at 2–5. The DOE suggested that local governments only approve cost-effective
projects with assessment values of only ten percent of the property’s value and an
assessment term shorter than the estimated useful life of the home improvement being
installed. Id. at 2–3.
50
See id. at 5–7. Here the DOE recommended only property owners with a higher
property value than the owner’s combined “public and private debt” be able to qualify for
PACE programs, as well as safeguards aimed at ensuring property owners be able to pay
the assessment. Id. at 6. Members of the mortgage industry received these voluntary
guidelines favorably, but expressed concern that the guidelines did not go far enough.
Letter from John Courson, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, to Shaun
Donovan, Sec’y Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., & Steven Chu, Sec’y Dep’t of Energy (July 9,
2010) (expressing appreciation for the DOE’s guidelines but noting that there are still
problems with PACE loans). For an example of a PACE statute with detailed underwriting
requirements, see ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35-A, § 10155.1 (2010):
A PACE agreement entered into pursuant to a PACE program must
comply with underwriting requirements established by rule by the
trust. . . . Underwriting requirements established by the trust must, at a
minimum:
A. Limit the amount of a PACE mortgage for qualifying property
that is residential property to $15,000;
B. Require debt-to-income ratios of not more than 50% for qualifying
property that is residential property;
45
46
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Then, on May 24, 2010, the DOE sent a letter to the Director of the
FHFA asking the FHFA and GSEs to clarify their objections to PACE
programs.51 The DOE also asked the FHFA to agree in writing to treat
property owners with preexisting PACE assessments as compliant with
the GSEs’ Uniform Security Instrument provisions. 52 Shortly after the
DOE issued these guidelines, California’s Attorney General filed suit
against the FHFA in federal court.
2.

California ex rel Brown v. FHFA

On July 14, 2010, California Attorney General Edmund Brown filed
suit against the FHFA in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California.53 The complaint accused Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and
C.

D.

Provide that the term of the PACE agreement not exceed the
estimated useful life of the financed energy savings
improvements;
Require that financed energy savings improvements are costeffective. . . .

Id.
51
Letter from Cathy Zoi, Assistant Sec’y of Dep’t of Energy, to Edward DeMarco, Acting
Dir. of Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency (May 24, 2010), available at http://www.mpowerplacer.org/
forms/L%20DOE%20Letter%20to%20Edward%20DeMarco%20Acting%20FHFA%205-2410%20(2).pdf [hereinafter Letter from DOE]. The letter specifically asked the FHFA to
develop guidelines that PACE programs should implement to be in accordance with the
GSE’s lending standards. Id.
52
Letter from Cathy Zoi, supra note 51. The FHFA ultimately complied with this
request. See supra note 44 (describing the FHFA’s promise to grandfather in PACE loans
that existed before July 6, 2010).
53
See generally Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36 (alleging that the FHFA is prohibiting
PACE programs). Former California Attorney General Brown has long been a vocal critic
of the GSEs’ actions. In May, he sent a letter to the FHFA reminding Acting Director
Edward DeMarco of conversations between Brown’s office and the FHFA in 2009. Letter
from Edmund Brown, Cal. Attorney Gen., to Edward DeMarco, Acting Dir. of Fed. Hous.
Fin. Agency (May 18, 2010), available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=
1920&. According to Brown, during the 2009 discussions, the FHFA assured the California
Attorney General that the FHFA would work with Brown’s office “on issues related to
PACE.” Id. The letter goes on to outline disruptions in PACE programs caused by Fannie
Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s lender and industry letters. Id. The letter concluded by
requesting immediate written confirmation from the FHFA that California’s programs do
not violate Fannie Mae’s or Freddie Mac’s lending guidelines. Id. If Brown did not receive
such written confirmation, he threatened to file suit seeking declaratory relief. Id.
Apparently, he never received such written confirmation because he filed suit on July 14,
2010. Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 2. In a press release that day, Brown explained
that he decided to sue the FHFA “to stop the regulatory strangulation of the state’s grassroots program.” Press Release, Cal. Attorney Gen. Edmund Brown, Brown Demands Feds
Preserve an Innovative and Successful California Clean Energy Program (May 18, 2010),
available at http://ag.ca.gov/newsalerts/release.php?id=1920&. He also sent a letter to
President Obama, that same day, explaining his reasons for filing suit and urging the
President “to do everything in [his] power to reverse [the FHFA’s] illegal and short-sighted
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the FHFA of misrepresenting PACE programs to benefit their own
financial interests at the expense of California property owners. 54
California alleged that the GSEs inaccurately characterized PACE
programs as loans, which would seriously harm California’s PACE
programs.55 The complaint argued that PACE liens have priority over
mortgages because they are valid property assessments. 56 According to
the complaint, PACE senior lien provisions comply with Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac guidelines because the GSEs have historically accepted
senior lien provisions in other assessment programs. 57
3.

Congressional Efforts to Resolve the Standoff

Throughout the entire PACE controversy, members of Congress
have been active spectators, writing letters to the President and

actions” and to provide “leadership on this most important matter.” Letter from Edmund
Brown, Cal. Attorney Gen., to President Barack Obama 1–2 (July 14, 2010), available at
http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/pdfs/n1951_ar-m355n_20100714_124838.pdf.
Five other claims have been filed in federal district court. Complaint, City of Palm Desert
v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 4:10CV04482 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2010), 2010 WL 4236788;
Complaint, Cnty. of Sonoma v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 4:10CV03270 (N.D. Cal. July
26, 2010); Complaint, Natural Res. Def. Council v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Auth., No. 1:10CV07467
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2010), 2010 WL 4000042; Complaint, Sierra Club v. Fed. Hous. Fin.
Agency, No. 4:10CV03317 (N.D. Cal. July 29, 2010), 2010 WL 3593758; Town of Babylon v.
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 2:10CV04916 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2010).
54
Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 2. California’s complaint specifically alleges that
the “government-sponsored, shareholder-owned private corporations,” Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the FHFA, are “misrepresenting . . . PACE programs and municipal
financing.” Id. As a result, the GSEs are putting their financial interests ahead of the wellbeing of California residents, according to the complaint. Id. More specifically, the
complaint accused the GSEs of trying to change the priority of assessments from a senior
lien to a junior lien “for their own benefit in violation of California law.” Id. at 8. As a
result, the GSEs’ opposition to PACE programs has “severely hamper[ed] California’s
efforts to assist thousands of California homeowners to reduce their energy and water use,
help drive the state’s green economy, and create significant numbers of skilled, stable and
well paying jobs.” Id. at 2.
55
Id. at 3. The complaint noted that the FHFA acknowledged that its public statements
have “effectively stopp[ed] PACE programs . . . with no clear indication of when, if ever,
such programs would be allowed to move forward in the future.” Id.
56
Id. The complaint additionally seeks a declaration that the FHFA must “conduct [an]
environmental review under [the National Environmental Policy Act] before taking any
action that will limit or foreclose PACE in California.” Id.
57
See id. at 5–6 (asserting that “[u]nder the plain language of California law, any liens
that result from PACE assessments have priority over mortgages, operating in the same
way as other assessments”). Municipal corporations are authorized to set up PACE
programs pursuant to the Mello-Roos Act, CAL. GOV. CODE § 5331, “which has been in
existence since 1982.” Brief for Plaintiff, supra note 36, at 5–6. But see Eisen, supra note 28,
at 86 (describing PACE programs as “more like . . . lending program[s] and less like . . . a
tax”).
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introducing bills, but taking no definitive action. 58 In October 2009,
Congressman Steve Israel introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives to help homeowners obtain private financing for energy
retrofits.59 Congress became more active as the standoff between PACE
supporters and the GSEs came to a head in the summer of 2010.
Congressman Mike Thompson and Senator Barbara Boxer, both from
California, introduced identical bills in the House and Senate to amend
Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s underwriting standards to comply with
the DOE’s PACE guidelines.60 Under the proposed legislation, any lien
provisions that complied with the DOE’s standards would automatically
comply with Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s Uniform Instruments. 61
The bills prohibit the GSEs from requiring homeowners to repay PACE
liens before being able to refinance or dispose of their property. 62 Under
See Letter from Congress to President Barack Obama (July 19, 2010), available at
http://www.seia.org/galleries/pdf/PACE%20Letter%20to%20President%20Obama%207.
19.10.pdf (expressing strong Congressional support for PACE programs). See generally H.R.
5766, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010) (proposing “[t]o ensure that the underwriting standards
of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac facilitate the use of property assessed clean energy
programs”); S. 3642, 111th Cong. (2d Sess. 2010) (proposing a plan identical to the plan set
forth in H.R. 5766); H.R. 3836, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009) (proposing “[t]o authorize the
Secretary of Energy to provide credit support to enhance the availability of private
financing for clean energy technology deployment”).
59
See H.R. 3836 (enabling the Secretary of Energy to provide credit to homeowners for
these projects). The bill was referred to the House Energy and Commerce Committee on
October 15, 2009, and the Committee has taken no further action. Bill Summary & Status
111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 3836, LIBRARY CONG.: THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/
cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:h.r.03836:# (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
60
H.R. 5766; S. 3642. In a press release from Senator Barbara Boxer’s office, Boxer
described the current uncertainty as “unacceptable,” while Senator Jeff Merkey of Oregon
described PACE programs as “a job creation trifecta” because these programs save
homeowners and businesses money, create jobs, and support the development of clean
energy. Press Release, Senator Barbara Boxer, Boxer, Colleagues Introduce Legislation to
Protect Clean-Energy Initiatives (July 22, 2010), available at http://boxer.senate.gov/en/
press/releases/072210.cfm. According to the release, the bill requires Fannie and Freddie
to “adopt new, sound underwriting standards that support PACE financing programs,
rather than stymie them [and] treat PACE assessments the same as other property tax
assessments . . . .” Id. The Senate version has four co-sponsors, while the identical House
version has twenty co-sponsors. Id.
61
H.R. 5766; S. 3642. The bills explain that:
Liens or other property obligations that secure property taxes or
assessments under a PACE program and are consistent with such
standards shall be considered to comply with the Uniform Instruments
of such Association and Corporation and shall not constitute a default
on an existing mortgage or trigger the exercise of lender’s remedies for
a property with such a lien.
Id.
62
See H.R. 5766; S. 3642 (stipulating that “the Association and the Corporation shall not
require repayment of a PACE program tax or assessment in order for a property owner to
finance, refinance or transfer the property”).
58
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these bills, if a property owner becomes delinquent in his or her PACE
payments, the property owner only owes “the unpaid delinquent
amount along with applicable penalties, interest and costs” in a
foreclosure.63 Finally, the bill prohibits the GSEs from implementing
different lending criteria for communities with PACE programs and
communities without PACE programs.64
Though these two bills represented Congress’s strongest attempt to
resolve the PACE controversy, they did not become law before the
Congressional term ended; each had only a small number of co-sponsors,
and neither made it out of committee.65 The inadequacy of these
solutions becomes apparent when examining the policy behind
municipal financing and tax liens.
C. The Relationship Between Bonds and Tax Liens
While local governments typically issue bonds to finance
improvements in special assessment districts, they can only use bonds to
finance public projects, and the bonds must finance capital
improvements.66 Even if the bond results in a private gift, the bond can
still be for a public purpose; thus, it can still be a valid exercise of a
63
H.R. 5766; S. 3642. This is also a provision in the DOE’s Best Practices framework.
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 3 (suggesting that local governments utilize nonacceleration clauses so that the defaulting owner only has to pay the delinquent amount,
not the total amount, of a PACE lien in a foreclosure). According to the DOE, nonacceleration clauses are an important tool to protect mortgage holders because of the
limited liability in a mortgage. Id. Under these provisions, subsequent property owners
must make future PACE lien payments. Id.
64
See H.R. 5766; S. 3642 (prohibiting the FHFA, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac from
“discriminat[ing] against communities implementing or participating in a PACE program,
including by prohibiting lending within the community or requiring more restrictive
underwriting criteria for properties within the community”).
65
See Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) H.R. 5766, LIBRARY CONG.:
THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:HR05766:|/home/Legislative
Data.php|# (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (listing fifty-six cosponsors, and reporting that the
last major action occurred on July 15, 2010 when the bill was referred to the House
Financial Services Committee); Bill Summary & Status 111th Congress (2009–2010) S.3642,
LIBRARY CONG.: THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:SN03642:|/
home/LegislativeData.php| (last visited Oct. 15, 2011) (listing five cosponsors, and
reporting that the last major action occurred on July 22, 2010 when the bill was referred to
the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee).
66
See WHITE, supra note 6, at 8 (explaining that bonds can only finance public projects,
not private gifts). Further, “prohibitions against gifts and loans of credit to individuals and
private corporations are the most frequently noted state constitutional limitations affecting
municipal bond issuance.” Id.; see also CAL. STS. & HIGH. CODE § 5101 (West 2007)
(authorizing bond financing for “any . . . streets, places, public ways, or property,
easements, or rights-of-way”); N.Y. LOCAL FIN. § 24.00 (McKinney 2009) (authorizing bond
financing, termed “tax anticipation notes” for water lighting or refuse and garbage district).
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municipality’s financing powers. 67 Both prohibitions have the same
general intent: to prevent taxpayers from having to pay for a bond long
after the benefit has gone away.68
Aside from these general limitations on bond issues, each particular
type of municipal bond is subject to a unique set of limitations. 69 While
municipalities may issue revenue bonds, general bonds, and special
assessment bonds, only special assessment bonds and mortgage-backed
revenue bonds are relevant to the discussion of PACE programs. 70 Local
governments can issue assessment bonds with senior lien repayment
provisions under their assessment authority. 71 The distinction between
junior and senior liens is essential to understanding the controversy
surrounding PACE programs.
The difference between a senior and junior interest is crucial in
determining what a mortgagee or lien holder will receive in a foreclosure

67
WHITE, supra note 6, at 8. For example, a municipality can “use . . . bond proceeds to
enable a private corporation to install pollution control equipment in its manufacturing
enterprise . . . because the public purpose is satisfied.” Id. The public purpose requirement
originates from municipalities’ early experiences with railroad bonds. Id. When a railroad
failed, the taxpayers still had to pay the debt from the railroad bond, even though the
purpose for which the bond had been raised no longer existed. Id.
68
See id. (explaining that the prohibition of private gifts and requirement of capital
improvements lessen the chances that taxpayers will have “to pay for something
nonexistent”). Without these requirements, “the burden of bond payment may outweigh
the benefit of enjoyment of the service or facility.” Id.; see also Haberman v. Washington
Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1045–46 (Wash. 1987) (noting that residents in a
Washington town had to pursue damages against a municipality through various tort and
securities law claims after the power utility cancelled a nuclear power plant construction
project). The project in Haberman never should have been financed through municipal
bonds because the power utility engaged in deceptive and fraudulent representations. Id.
Similarly, in Ross v. Bank South, N.A., developers convinced Vestiva Hills, Alabama to back
a bond issuance aimed at raising funds to construct “a residential and medical facility for
the elderly.” 885 F.2d 723, 726 (11th Cir. 1989). Investors were forced to sue the issuing
authority on various federal and state securities law grounds as well as tort law grounds
when they lost money because the value of the project was far below the original
$29,950,500 value of the bonds. Id. at 725. Finally, in Ockerman v. May Zima & Co., May
Zima & Company “publicly sold Mortgage Revenue Bonds issued by the City of Bowling
Green, Kentucky, for $5,500,000.00 . . . to acquire . . . a retirement village in Bowling Green,
Kentucky.” 27 F.3d 1151, 1153 (6th Cir. 1994). They were forced to sue the issuers under
federal securities laws. Id. at 1154. In each of these situations, the burden of paying the
bonds outweighed the benefit to the public.
69
See WHITE, supra note 6, at 10 (describing the types of projects that each type of
municipal bond may finance and the requirements that must be met before each type of
bond can be used).
70
See id. at 10–11 (noting that “mortgage-backed bonds[] are of particular interest to
solar facility financing”).
71
See id. (explaining local governments’ bond authority).
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sale.72 When a financial institution forecloses one interest, only interests
junior to it are foreclosed.73 In a foreclosure, the property is sold and the
sale price is used to satisfy the senior mortgage. 74 If there is money left,
that surplus satisfies junior liens in order of their priority. 75 These junior

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.4 (1997) (describing the difference
between junior and senior liens). All junior mortgages and liens are referred to as
“secondary financing.” JASPER, supra note 41, at 7 (internal quotation marks omitted). A
party holding junior debt will not be fully protected in the event of a foreclosure. See
Symposium on Commercial Law, Foreclosure, Loss, and the Proper Distribution of Insurance
Proceeds Under the Open and Standard Mortgage Clauses: Some Observations, 7 VAL. U. L. REV.
485, 486 (1973) (“The mortgagee’s interest under the policy extends only to a security for
his debt, and such interest ceases when the debt is extinguished.”). “A foreclosure of the
mortgaged property . . . therefore, totally extinguish[es] the interest.” Id.
73
See Sumitomo Bank v. Davis, 6 Cal. Rptr. 2d 381, 385 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining
that a foreclosure sale “removes liens . . . junior to the one being foreclosed”); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.1 (1997) (noting that “a valid foreclosure” of a
senior mortgage eliminates all junior mortgages and liens but not senior mortgages or
liens); MILTON R. FRIEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL
PROPERTY § 3.163 (James Charles Smith ed., 2010) (explaining that junior interests often
contain a clause stipulating that “any default in the first mortgage shall, ipso facto,
constitute a default in the junior mortgage and permit its foreclosure”). Comment a
explains that in general mortgage and lien seniority is “determined by the chronological
order of their creation.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.1 cmt. a (1997).
74
See General Bank v. Westbrooke Pointe, Inc., 548 So. 2d 736, 736 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989) (noting the well established Florida principle that any surplus from a foreclosure
should be distributed to “junior lienholders” based on the junior lien’s priority); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.4 (1997) (“When the foreclosure sale price
exceeds the amount of the mortgage obligation, the surplus is applied to liens and other
interests terminated by the foreclosure in order of their priority and the remaining balance,
if any, is distributed to the holder of the equity of redemption.”); JASPER, supra note 41, at 7
(explaining that junior mortgages and liens have high risk because the lender only has a
property interest in the surplus after all prior mortgages have been satisfied). If the
property owner does not have enough equity in the property to cover all senior mortgages
and junior liens, the junior lien holders will not receive any compensation in a foreclosure.
Id. “[E]quity” is defined as “the difference between the current market value of the
property and the total debt obligations against the property, including any prior mortgage
loans.” Id. In determining a property’s equity, lenders look at the property’s LTV, which is
calculated by “divid[ing] the total loan amount by the value of [the] home.” Id. at 43–44.
Each additional mortgage or lien increases the property’s LTV, which increases the
likelihood that the mortgages will not be repaid. Id. at 44.
75
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.4 cmt. a (1997); see also JASPER, supra note
41, at 85–86 (noting that a “foreclosure . . . put[s] the foreclosure sale purchaser in the shoes
of the borrower at the time he executed the mortgage being foreclosed”); GRANT S. NELSON
& DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 696 (5th ed. 2007) (“[T]he surplus
represents the remnant of the equity of redemption . . . [and] [c]onsequently . . . stands in
the place of the foreclosed real estate and the liens and interest that previously attached to
that real estate now attach to the surplus.”). People who held interests in the land are
“paid out of the surplus in the order of priority they enjoyed prior to foreclosure.” Id. at
697.
72
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liens are paid in the same order of priority as before the foreclosure. 76 A
property owner can change the order of priority by subordinating a
mortgage to another lien, but in general, the person whose interest is
being subordinated must consent to the change.77 Subordination is
usually disadvantageous to the holders of senior interests. 78
The difference between junior and senior liens also affects the bond’s
rating.79 Bonds with subordinate or junior repayment provisions are
termed “junk bonds” because they are less likely to be repaid. 80
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.4 cmt. b (1997). Also, “foreclosed junior
lienors are entitled to surplus even though their liens are not in default at the time of
foreclosure.” Id. Finally, the claim of the holder of the foreclosed equity of redemption to
the surplus is subordinate to the claims of all other holders of liens and interests terminated
by the foreclosure. Id.; see also Brown v. Crookston Agric. Ass’n, 26 N.W. 907, 907 (Minn.
1886) (explaining that once a property is foreclosed, “the junior mortgagee is
transferred . . . to the surplus of the money arising from the sale . . . [and] the court will
apply the [surplus] in accordance with their rights as they existed with respect to the
land”).
77
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.7 (1997).
A mortgage, by a declaration of its mortgagee, may be made
subordinate in priority to another interest in the mortgaged real
estate . . . if the interest to which the mortgage is being subordinated is
described with reasonable specificity in the declaration.
A
subordination that would materially prejudice the mortgagor or the
person whose interest is advanced in priority is ineffective without the
consent of the person prejudiced.
Id.; see also THOMAS D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS § 8.09(2)(b)
(1991) (describing the two methods of subordination).
78
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.7 cmt. a (1997) (explaining that
subordination “reduce[s] the mortgage’s priority below that of some other interest . . . to
which the mortgage would otherwise be superior”); see also CRANDALL, supra note 77,
§ 8.09(2)(a) (noting that lenders will hesitate to lend if the property is already subject to a
senior interest because of “the legitimate concern of the potential lender that his later-intime mortgage may be subordinate to an existing interest”).
79
See Georgette C. Poindexter et al., Selling Municipal Property Tax Receivables: Economics,
Privatization, and Public Policy in an Era of Urban Distress, 30 CONN. L. REV. 157, 171 (1997)
(explaining that a lien’s priority is its “determinative and crucial factor” in assessing the
value of the lien because “[a]n inferior lien . . . is of less value to the purchaser” since these
liens are satisfied only after all superior liens have been satisfied). See generally Johnstone,
supra note 41, at 516 (explaining that lenders will take secondary market purchasers’
preferences into account when making a loan, which means that “resale marketability is
usually a consideration during the mortgage loan origination stage”).
80
See WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE FINANCE: CASES AND MATERIALS 244 (6th ed.
2008) (explaining that Moody’s and Standard & Poor’s rate an issuing entity’s “likelihood
of default”). Under Standard & Poor’s rating system, “rates [range] between AAA and D
(default), [where] [j]unk is below BBB.” Id.; see also Fitch Affirms Cape Coral, FL's
Outstanding Water & Sewer Revs, BANs & Special Assessment Debt, BUSINESSWIRE (May 27,
2010, 5:47 PM), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20100527006879/en/FitchAffirms-Cape-Coral-FLs-Outstanding-Water (reporting on two Cape Coral Florida bond
issues, one which was rated A+, and the other was rated BBB+). The A+ rated bond had a
senior lien payback provision but the BBB+ rated bond had a subordinate repayment
76
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Investors often hesitate to invest in these junk bonds because they are not
guaranteed a return on their investment. 81 Conversely, investors
willingly invest in bonds with senior repayment provisions, typically
referred to as AAA or AA bonds, because they are fairly certain to
receive a return on their investment.82 Since AAA or AA bonds are
much more likely to attract investors than junk bonds, programs with
senior lien provisions are more likely to successfully finance the
proposed improvement.83 This means that a bond’s value is directly
related to a lien’s priority.
While mortgage or lien priority is generally determined by the “first
in time, first in right” principal, there are several important exceptions. 84
provision. Id. But see Fitch Rates Bay Area Toll Bridge, CA Seismic Bonds ‘AA’, FREE LIBRARY
(July 24, 2003), http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Fitch+Rates+Bay +Area+Toll+Bridge,+CA
+Seismic+Bonds+'AA'.-a0105782041 (reporting on a plan in California to make two bond
issues, one with a senior lien priority and one with a junior lien priority to finance bridge
upgrades). The California plan’s second lien priority is significant because it shows that
junior liens are a feasible means of raising revenue. Id.
81
See STANDARD & POOR’S, THE TIME DIMENSION OF STANDARD & POOR’S CREDIT
RATINGS 11 (2010), available at http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/media/
TheTimeDimensionOfStandardPoorsCreditRatings.pdf (explaining that “rating definitions
are phrased in terms of an obligor’s capacity to meet its financial commitment”) (internal
quotations omitted); see also STONE & YOUNGBERG, LAND-SECURED MUNICIPAL DEBT: A
GUIDE TO BUYING NON-RATED, LAND-SECURED BONDS 3 (2007) (urging investors to invest
in land-secured bonds if “[t]he value of the land being taxed [or] assessed is at least three
times the bond lien” to “offset credit weaknesses” inherent in land-secured municipal
financing).
82
STANDARD & POOR’S, supra note 81, at 11 (“The actual language of the definitions uses
different adjectives . . . to describe the obligor’s capacity as follows: ‘AAA’ (extremely
strong), ‘AA’ (very strong), ‘A’ (strong), and ‘BBB’ (adequate).”). The S&P guidelines break
down the obligor’s ability to pay into four categories. See id.
83
See Urbish v. City of Dallas, 260 S.W.2d 148, 150 (Tex. App. 1953) (explaining that if
municipal bonds are offered with junior lien repayment provisions, the government’s
purpose behind issuing the bonds would not be funded); see also Letter from Chris
Moriarty, Dir., & John Rhow, Senior Vice President, Barclays Capital, to Jeffrey
Tannenbaum, Fir Tree Partners (Sept. 14, 2009), available at http://pacenow.org/
documents/Pace%20letter%20sept%202009%20re%20liens%20_2_%20_2_%20%20Barclays%20%209-14-09%20_3_.pdf [hereinafter Barclay’s Letter] (arguing that
Standard and Poor’s rating system applies to PACE bonds and that junior PACE liens
would generate “little to no meaningful bond buyer interest”).
84
The “‘first in time, first in right’” principle means that “[t]he first lien recorded
generally gets priority over later-recorded liens.” SCHMUDDE, supra note 8, at 307; see
CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 77, § 8.09(b) (noting that “‘first in time, first in right’ is the
basic priority rule regarding interests in real estate, including mortgages”); JASPER, supra
note 41, at 86 (explaining that the “first in time, first in right” priority is “established by
compliance with the recording acts”); see also Vesta Holdings I, LLC v. Tax Comm’r of
Fulton Cnty., 578 S.E.2d 293, 295 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (explaining that the “first in time, first
in right” principle applies to “mortgages . . . and nontax liens”); Pelican Homestead & Sav.
Ass’n v. Sec. First Nat’l. Bank, 532 So. 2d 397, 400 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that “[t]he
priority of competing mortgages” is determined by when the mortgages were filed and not
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PACE supporters argue that PACE programs fall within one exception,
the tax lien.85 State legislatures have the power to create tax liens and
determine their priority relative to that of other types of liens and
property interests, even if the tax lien was created after other property
interests came into existence.86 While a state may give a tax lien any
by the parties’ intent); Valley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. T-Bird Home Centers, Inc., 741
P.2d 826, 828 (N.M. 1987) (holding that T-Bird’s lien is senior because T-Bird’s workers
began work before Valley Federal’s mortgage was recorded). This rule “applies to
resolving . . . priority disputes between mortgages, [and] to disputes between a mortgagee
and another form of interest.” CRANDALL ET AL., supra note 77, § 8.09(b). But see
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTG. § 7.1 cmt. a (1997) (noting that the “first in time,
first in right” rule “is subject to a multitude of limitations”). Priority rules developed in the
English colonies and in the early years of the American Republic. See George Lee Flint, Jr.
& Marie Juliet Alfaro, Secured Transactions History: The Impact of English Smuggling on
Chattel Mortgage Acts in the Spanish Borderlands, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 703, 755–56 (2003)
(examining early recording statutes that “were mandatory for realty mortgages” that
mandated “priority by time of filing”). Indeed, the “first in time, first in right” principle
was so well-settled in American property law, that Chief Justice John Marshall “believed
[it] to be universal” only a half-century after the founding of the Republic. Rankin &
Schatzell v. Scott, 25 U.S. 177, 179 (1827). “[A] prior lien gives a prior claim” and “[i]t has
never been supposed that a subsequent mortgage could . . . obtain precedence over a prior
mortgage.” Id.
85
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 6 (arguing that these “programs are a legal
exercise of the municipal taxing power”). According to PACE proponents, the liens
imposed by these programs are valid tax assessment liens. Id.
86
See EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.142 (3d ed. 2011)
(noting that “[T]he legislature has the full power to determine and fix the priority of tax
liens [and] has unquestioned power to make these liens prior and superior to other liens
and encumbrances”); see also In re Boerne Hills Leasing Corp., 15 F.3d 57, 59 (5th Cir. 1994)
(holding that state taxing entities’ liens are senior to other creditors’ liens); City of Phoenix
v. Wayland, 167 P.2d 933, 934 (Ariz. 1946) (explaining that the state “[l]egislature has full
power” to make tax liens senior to all other liens “[u]nless restricted by the state
Constitution”); ITT Diversified Credit Corp. v. Couch, 669 P.2d 1355, 1362 (Colo. 1983)
(noting that the state legislature has the power to “establish the relative priority of tax
liens”); Vesta Holdings I, LLC, 578 S.E.2d at 294–95 (holding that the legislature has the
power to rank tax liens ahead of other types of mortgages and liens); Baldwin v. Moroney,
91 N.E. 3, 5 (Ind. 1910) (explaining that the state legislature can impose assessment liens
superior to “pre-existing mortgages”); Licking v. Hays Lumber Co., 19 N.W.2d 148, 150
(Neb. 1945) (explaining that tax lien priority is determined by “local constitutions and
statutes” and legislatures can make such liens senior to any preexisting liens or mortgages);
First NH Bank v. Town of Windham, 639 A.2d 1089, 1091 (N.H. 1994) (noting that tax liens
may become “superior encumbrances” either by express or implied statutory provisions);
State ex rel. Comm’r Land Office v. Passmore, 115 P.2d 120, 121 (Okla. 1941) (describing tax
liens as “creatures of the [state] Constitution or statutes”); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v.
Black, 247 P. 486, 487 (Utah 1926) (explaining that the state legislature can make a tax lien
superior to “all other liens of whatsoever nature”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Bench Canal
Drainage Dist., 108 P.2d 590, 593 (Wy. 1940) (explaining that the state legislature has the
power to fix the priority of assessment liens); 72 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation § 806
(2001) (“Statutes may make tax liens a first lien upon the property of the taxpayer, giving
them priority over a mortgage or any other lien existing against the property, whether
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priority, state statutes usually give municipal tax liens a senior lien
position because this is the only way that local governments can collect
the money from the property owner.87

created before or after the assessment of the tax.”); 72 AM. JUR. 2D State and Local Taxation
§ 798 (2001) (pointing out that the priority of tax liens is determined by “local constitutions
and statutes”). But see Wayland, 167 P.2d at 934 (explaining that tax or assessment liens
from different state entities (i.e. state taxes and county taxes) only have the equal priority if
“they are all collected together at one time,” otherwise the tax collected later is junior to the
tax collected earlier).
87
See Scottish Am. Mortgage Co., Ltd. v. Minidoka Cnty., 272 P. 498, 500 (Idaho 1928)
(explaining that if tax liens were not senior to all other liens, “the state would be powerless
to collect her revenue” since other liens often exceed the property’s value); Minneapolis
Threshing Machine Co. v. Roberts Cnty., 149 N.W. 163, 164 (S.D. 1914) (“It is essential, in
order that the state may collect its revenue and carry on the public business, to make such a
tax a paramount lien . . . .”); Urbish, 260 S.W.2d at 150 (explaining that tax or assessment
liens exist to ensure that a governmental project is properly financed); 72 AM. JUR. 2D State
and Local Taxation § 806 (2001) (maintaining that a senior tax lien is constitutional, and
“essential, in order that the state may collect its revenue and carry on the public
business . . .”); see also Freeman Furniture Factories v. Bowlds, 136 F.2d 136, 140 (6th Cir.
1943) (explaining that only “state and county taxes . . . and prior improvement taxes” are
senior to local assessments) (internal quotation marks omitted); Cal. Loan & Trust Co. v.
Weis, 50 P. 697, 698 (Cal. 1897) (validating the legislature’s power to impose senior
assessment liens); Horn v. City of Miami Beach, 194 So. 620, 624 (Fla. 1940) (holding that
lawful tax liens create a lien senior “to all other liens”); Riviera Club v. Belle Mead Dev.
Corp., 194 So. 783, 785 (Fla. 1939) (holding that mortgage rights must be junior to “proper
and lawful taxes”); City of Lake Worth v. McLeod, 151 So. 318, 319 (Fla. 1933) (explaining
that “municipal special assessments” and state statutory tax liens only have the same
priority if the state statute explicitly provides so); Wabash E. Ry. Co. v. Comm’rs of E. Lake
Fork Special Drainage Dist., 25 N.E. 781, 785 (Ill. 1890) (explaining that a purchaser and
lender enter into a mortgage with notice that local governments have an implied right to
create liens senior to their mortgage); Joe Self Chevrolet, Inc. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 802
P.2d 1231, 1240 (Kan. 1990) (noting that state legislatures may make tax liens senior to other
liens or mortgages since the priority is “determined by the constitution and statute”);
Rosenthal v. Floor Coverings, Inc., 73 So. 2d 39, 41 (La. Ct. App. 1954) (noting that the tax
collector can demand payment of delinquent taxes before payment of other debts);
Collector of Taxes of Lowell v. Slafsky, 127 N.E.2d 309, 312 (Mass. 1955) (explaining that tax
payments are supposed to be paid before payments to creditors); Krull v. Bennett Homes &
Lumber Co., 258 A.D. 10, 13 (N.Y. App. Div. 1939) (explaining that courts must look at state
statutes when determining whether municipal tax liens have the same priority as state tax
liens); Dunkirk Trust Co. v. Dunkirk Laundry Co., 182 N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (Chautauqua
County Ct. 1959) (explaining that New York statutes stipulate that “local taxes, assessments
and water rates” are senior to other liens); Pope v. Knoxville Indus. Bank, Inc., 121 S.W.2d
530, 532 (Tenn. 1938) (reversing a lower court ruling which “den[ied] priority in payment
of the tax debt”); Herbert C. Heller & Co. v. P. O. Duncan, 159 S.E. 52, 53 (W. Va. 1931)
(holding that both paving liens and sewer liens are senior to other liens); Poindexter, supra
note 79, at 157 (explaining that tax liens “usually have super priority over all other liens
except those imposed by the federal or state government”). Additionally, real estate taxes
are extremely efficient, in large part because the first priority position of property taxes
“virtually ensur[es] that it can be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the property.”
SCHMUDDE, supra note 8, at 263.
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In recent years, many local governments have privatized their
collection of real estate taxes, which serves to make the collection even
more efficient and to ensure that local governments “efficiently collect
their real estate taxes.”88 The ultimate resolution of these financial and
legal disputes depends on whether PACE programs can be classified as
property tax assessments with senior lien status. 89
D. The Specific Elements of a Valid Special Assessment District
A valid property assessment must meet several elements: For
instance, it must serve a public purpose and must provide a local
improvement. 90 The improvement must also benefit the public at large,
88
SCHMUDDE, supra note 8, at 264. This process is known as “tax farming” and is now
used in most U.S. jurisdictions. Id. This process allows municipal corporations to hold a
first priority lien on property with delinquent taxes, and sell the lien to an investor. Id. The
investor must pay cash for the lien and then either collects delinquent money from the
property owner or forecloses on the property. Id. In exchange, the municipal corporation
is able to shift the collection and foreclosure burden to a third party and receive full
payment for the debts owed. Id.
89
See infra Part III (analyzing whether PACE programs satisfy the requirements of valid
property assessments).
90
See Ruel v. Rapid City, 167 N.W.2d 541, 544 (S.D. 1969) (explaining that local
governments use special assessments to raise funds for a specific “municipal purpose,” and
as a result, only apply the assessment to a specific portion of the municipality). Special
assessments have the same practical effect as taxes, but are not, in a legal sense, taxes.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 73, § 4.73; see also In re Peplinski’s Estate, 39 A.2d 271, 274 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1944) (explaining that assessments “are not taxes in a strict sense of the word”); 70C
AM. JUR. 2D Special or Local Assessments § 2 (2010) (explaining that while the terms “tax” and
“assessment” are often used interchangeably, they are not the same). An assessment is a
“distribution of a burden that would otherwise be imposed on the public.” 70C AM. JUR.
2D Special or Local Assessments § 2 (2010). Additionally, an assessment is a “specific levy
designed to recover the costs of improvements that confer local and peculiar benefits upon
property within a defined area.” Id. The bond must finance “an improvement that confers
a general benefit upon the public at large within the assessing entity [and]
must . . . support . . . an improvement that confers a special benefit upon the individual
properties assessed.” WHITE, supra note 6, at 15; see also Lipscomb v. Lenon, 276 S.W. 367,
368 (Ark. 1925) (explaining that the improvement must “peculiarly and especially
benefit[]” property in the district); Bank v. Bell, 217 P. 538, 543 (Cal. 1932) (explaining that
legislatures have discretion in defining a public purpose); Daggett v. Colgan, 28 P. 51, 52
(Cal. 1891) (explaining that the legislature must decide “what is for the public good, and
what are public purposes”); City of Waukegan v. DeWolf, 101 N.E. 532, 533 (Ill. 1913)
(explaining that an assessment must primarily provide a public improvement for the
specific residents of the district, though it may provide an incidental benefit for the general
public as well). In Saunders v. Mayor of Arlington, the Georgia Supreme Court reasoned that
if the city’s maintenance of an ice plant was “for the public good” it could be upheld. 94
S.E. 1022, 1024 (Ga. 1918). The Georgia Supreme Court upheld the public financing of an
ice plant because the installation of such a plant clearly benefits the “health and comfort of
the citizens.” Id. Another example of a local improvement is the installation of utility
poles. Ewart v. Vill. of W. Springs, 54 N.E. 478, 480 (Ill. 1899). A tax, on the other hand, “is
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and not just the property owner, to meet the public purpose test. 91
Additionally, assessments can only be applied to lands that receive
special benefits.92 The benefits must be based on something more than

an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government. United States v. La
Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931); see also U.S. v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, 518
U.S. 213, 224 (1996) (applying the definition in La Franca to a case dealing with the federal
Bankruptcy Code). The debate over the definition of a tax is playing out in the federal
courts as part of the legal challenge to the Affordable Care Act. See Thomas More Law
Center v. Obama, No. 10-2388, 2011 WL 2556039, at *20 (6th Cir. June, 2011) (applying the
La Franca definition to hold that the disputed provision is not a tax).
91
Halsted v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966); see also City of
Whittier v. Dixon, 151 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1944) (holding that an assessment to finance
construction of parking lots is a public improvement because parking lots benefit
neighboring properties by leading to economic development in the assessed community);
Irish v. Hahn, 281 P. 385, 387 (Cal. 1929) (holding that a municipality’s installation of
underground conduits for electric wires was a public improvement, and citing precedent
cases which held construction of a tunnel and construction of lights for a trolley as public
improvements); City of Edwardsville v. Jenkins, 33 N.E. 2d 598, 601 (Ill. 1941) (holding that
improvement of a sewer system was a public improvement); Hamilton v. Portland Pier Site
Dist., 112 A. 836, 840 (Me. 1921) (explaining that a municipality could finance the
construction of a public dock, but could not finance the construction of a private dock);
Hinman v. Temple, 274 N.W. 605, 607 (Neb. 1937) (holding that construction of a viaduct
over a busy railroad right of way is a public benefit). In Hamilton, the Maine Supreme
Court held that South Portland, Maine could finance the construction of a public dock
because the dock would benefit the local community by allowing businesses to transport
goods from the highway to a shipping line by water. Hamilton, 112 A. at 840. The court
distinguished such docks from purely private docks where “[t]he owner . . . may have the
right to the exclusive enjoyment of the structure, and to exclude all other persons from its
use.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Although the Maine statute in question allowed
South Portland to finance public and private docks, the court only invalidated that
provision, while allowing the municipality to continue financing pubic docks. Id.
92
See Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (reasoning that property assessments are based on the
theory that the property owner receives a benefit from the improved property); Dixon, 151
P.2d at 7 (holding that assessed property must receive a special benefit). Further, an
assessment can only be applied to a piece of property if the property is actually benefited.
Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642. The court noted, however, that the assessment will possibly
satisfy the benefit requirement if “the property can be presumed to have received an
especial benefit” from the work completed. Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Martin v. Dist.
of Colombia, 205 U.S. 135, 140 (1907) (explaining that “the apportionment is to be limited to
the benefit”); Baldwin v. Moroney, 91 N.E. 3, 5 (Ind. 1910) (reasoning that property owners
take property with the understanding that the local government may impose a burden on
the property to pay for improvements that provide a special benefit to the property); Fisher
v. City of Astoria, 269 P. 853, 856 (Or. 1928) (explaining that an improvement must
“substantial[ly] benefit” a property before a local government can impose an assessment);
In re Peplinski’s Estate, 39 A.2d at 274 (Assessments “are based on a theory of special benefit
to the property against which the assessments are levied”); Ruel, 167 N.W.2d at 545 (local
governments make special assessments if the assessed property receives a special benefit);
MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 38.37 (explaining that in general only property receiving a
benefit may be assessed). The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned that an assessment will be
valid if it primarily benefits the district and incidentally benefits the entire city, but will not
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speculation, but it is not necessary that the property directly benefit from
the assessment.93
Furthermore, assessment values cannot account for a large
proportion of the property’s value, nor can they be disproportionately
larger than other assessments on the property.94 Unless a state statute
requires a certain formula to determine an assessment’s proportionality,
local governments can use any equitable method to calculate an
assessment’s benefits to a property. 95 Even if a statute does not proscribe
a certain formula, the statute might set a maximum assessment amount.
For example, an assessment may not exceed twenty-five percent of the
property value.96 Finally, the government may construct the
be valid if it only incidentally benefits the district while primarily benefiting the entire city.
Fisher, 269 P. at 856–57.
93
See Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 3 of Sevier Cnty. Ark., 266
U.S. 379, 388 (1924) (upholding an assessment with an indirect benefit because that benefit
was calculated based on estimations); WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (warning that benefits
measured by an estimated increase or decrease in the fair market value of the property
could lead to “allegations that the assessments are based merely upon speculation or
conjecture”); see also Hamilton, 112 A. at 836, 839 (reasoning that the “benefit and burden”
must be reasonably proportionate); Clark v. City of Royal Oak, 38 N.W.2d 413, 418–19
(Mich. 1949) (holding that drains serve a public benefit because they improve “the
sanitation and health of the residents” even though the benefit cannot be put in monetary
terms). In Hamilton, the Maine Supreme Court found that the proposed improvement was
beneficial because a new port, combined with Maine’s “advantageous geographical
position” will lead to more commerce, which in turn will make the state more prosperous
and increase the general welfare. 112 A. at 839–40.
94
WHITE, supra note 6, at 16; see Gast Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S.
55, 59 (1916) (explaining that an assessment is invalid if “the parties will be taxed
disproportionately to each other and to the benefit conferred”); Houck v. Little River
Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265 (1915) (explaining that the assessment must be
proportional “to position, frontage, area, market value, or to benefits estimated by
commissioners”); Spring St. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 148 P. 217, 220 (Cal. 1915)
(invalidating an assessment because it was not proportional); Hamilton, 112 A. at 836
(explaining that the statute appears to apply a proportional benefit on the assessed
properties); MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 38.37 (explaining that since the assessment amount
and the value of the benefit must be proportional, a lack of proportionality could constitute
a confiscation of property in violation of due process of law). The Maine Supreme Court
reasoned that the assessment was proportional because of the dramatic increases in
maritime commerce that would result from the new port and the resulting increases in
prosperity and welfare. Hamilton, 112 A. at 839–40.
95
WHITE, supra note 6, at 16; see MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 38.37 (explaining that while
local governments must consider increases in property values when determining an
assessment value, they must not limit the analysis to such figures since “benefits cannot
always be translated into dollar terms” and benefits may only occur at some future time).
96
See JOHN RAO ET. AL, FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS, AND MORTGAGE
SERVICING 441 (3d ed. 2010) (explaining that the assessment is levied “at a percentage set by
statute”); WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (noting that “express limitations are common . . . as that
the burden shall not exceed twenty, twenty-five, forty . . . percent of the value of the land or
property assessed”); see also DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 3 (suggesting that PACE
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improvement “without the consent of the particular individuals
affected.”97 If the government needs the property owners’ consent to
construct the improvement, it is simply a private improvement that
cannot be financed by assessment bonds.98
A large body of case law supports the proposition that a property tax
assessment legally constitutes a senior lien on a homeowner’s property. 99
For instance, in German Savings & Loan Society v. Ramish, Los Angeles
residents asked the town to change the street grade to benefit the general
public.100
The council established a special assessment district
encompassing the properties along the road to pay the costs of
upgrading the right-of-way, and charged the project’s costs to the

programs “not exceed [ten percent] of a property’s estimated value”). Several cases set
specific percentages. Cf. Withrow v. City of Nashville, 224 S.W. 614, 614 (Ark. 1920)
(allowing a 20% limit); City Street Improvement Co. v. Quigley, 215 P. 390, 391 (Cal. 1923)
(allowing a 50% limit); Uhlenhake v. City of Ossian, 418 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Iowa 1988)
(allowing a 25% limit); Ward v. City of Louisville, 138 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Ky. 1940) (allowing
a 75% limit); In re Local Improvement Dist. 417, 268 P. 164, 166 (Wash. 1928) (allowing a
40% limit).
97
Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642; see also Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459, 462 (N.D.
1925) (holding that a voluntary indemnity program did not create a senior tax lien since
property owners could freely opt into and out of the program). Twelve years later, the
North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that a similar program cannot be classified as either
a valid tax lien or assessment lien because of the program’s voluntary nature. Fed. Farm
Mortg. Corp. v. Falk, 270 N.W. 885, 888 (N.D. 1937). But see Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. New
Iberia, 921 F.2d 610, 616 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the Federal Deposit Insurance
Company (“FDIC”) could not challenge the validity of a special assessment on property to
which it held a mortgage because the property owners voluntarily requested the local
government to impose the assessment).
98
Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642; see also Hamilton, 112 A. at 840 (distinguishing between
public and private docks and holding that a municipality can only finance construction of a
public dock).
99
See generally Guinn v. McReynolds, 170 P. 421 (Cal. 1918) (concluding that tax liens can
constitute senior liens as long as the legislature gives the liens that priority); German Sav. &
Loan Soc’y v. Ramish, 69 P. 89, 92 (Cal. 1902) (“The power to levy a tax for general
purposes, which shall be a lien superior to all other liens prior or otherwise, is not
doubted . . . .”); People ex. rel Griffin v. Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419 (N.Y. 1851) (explaining that tax
liens are senior to preexisting mortgages). Some statutes permit “secondary repayment
sources for assessment financing” to provide security “[i]n addition to the security offered
by the assessment and consequent lien.” WHITE, supra note 6, at 17. White listed “a
guaranty fund” as one method of secondary security. Id. A guaranty fund, sometimes
called a Loan Loss Reserve Fund (“Reserve Fund”) is an “interest-bearing Deposit
Account” used to pay shortages in a loan program. What is the Loan Loss Reserve Fund?,
13 C.F.R. § 120.710(a) (2010). Reserve Funds help “achieve economies of scale by
aggregating projects either geographically or by project type.” U.S. DEP’T of ENERGY, LOAN
LOSS RESERVES:
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD (TEXT VERSION) 8 (2010), available at
http://sustainableconnections.org/energy/energychallenge/loan-loss-reserves.
100
69 P. 89, 91 (Cal. 1902). They requested the city council to improve the city streets. Id.
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residents in the district.101 Several lots in the district were eventually
sold because the property owners did not pay bonds issued to finance
the street improvement.102 The property owners then filed suit for an
injunction to prevent Los Angeles’ treasurer from deeding the property
to a third party.103 The California Supreme Court denied the property
owners’ request and noted that this tax is a lien senior to all other liens so
that local governments can finance governmental duties. 104 The court
also concluded that maintaining and improving roads is a valid public
purpose, and it can be financed through a special tax assessment with a
senior lien provision.105 The court reasoned that because the special
assessment statute required a senior lien, the parties to a mortgage
entered into their agreement knowing that the city could impose a senior
lien on the property.106
However, another body of state case law supports the proposition
that a local government cannot classify a lien as a tax lien or a property
assessment lien when homeowners voluntarily opt into or out of the
program that imposes the lien.107 In Davis v. McLean County, North
Dakota passed a statute establishing an “indemnity hail tax” program
that required homeowners to pay a tax on each acre of their property
unless they opted out of the program.108 Revenue from this tax went into
a special fund to indemnify residents whose crops were damaged by
hail.109 When the homeowners foreclosed on their land, they claimed
that the hail tax was not a valid tax because it was voluntary, and the
program did not constitute a senior lien on their property. 110 The North
Dakota Supreme Court agreed with the homeowners, reasoning that

Id. The city council justified creating a special assessment district because road
improvement provided a public benefit to the local community. Id.
102
Id.
103
See id. at 91–92 (explaining the nature of this injunctive action).
104
See id. at 92 (explaining that tax liens must be senior to all preexisting and subsequent
liens so that local governments can “rais[e] revenue . . . to execute the functions of
government”).
105
Id. Specifically, the court noted that “the principles on which the system of general
taxation depends, and which govern in the enforcement of tax levies for general purposes,
are also applicable to taxation for the improvement of streets, the construction of sewers,
and other like public work.” Id.
106
See id. at 92 (explaining that “a purchaser takes title with the implied paramount right
of the public for the uses named”).
107
See generally Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459 (N.D. 1925) (invalidating a senior
lien provision in a voluntary indemnity hail tax provision).
108
Id. at 459.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 462.
101
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because the program operated like a contract between the local
government and property owners, it did not impose a senior tax lien.111
More recently, in City of Gainesville v. Florida, the Florida Supreme
Court ruled that a voluntary storm water management system was a fee
instead of a special assessment.112 The program imposed a fee on
Gainesville residents, but residents could opt out if they did not use the
service.113 The court noted the factors that distinguish fees from
assessments, and ultimately concluded that this program was a fee. 114
For instance, fees pay for a benefit to a specific property, while
assessments confer a benefit on a property in a specific area; fees are only
imposed on participants, while assessments are imposed on everyone. 115
Having explained each of the elements of a valid property assessment
and the function of tax and assessment liens, the following question
remains: Do PACE statutes qualify as valid property assessments that
enable local governments to impose senior tax liens on participating
homeowners?
III. ANALYSIS
Before local governments can validly impose property assessment
liens on participating properties, PACE programs must meet the

See id. at 463 (reasoning that the indemnity program is not an actual tax because the
state does not compel residents to pay; instead residents may voluntarily take part in the
program). The court continued that taxes are neither express nor implied contracts
between parties, but rather “positive acts of the government . . . binding upon the
inhabitants.” Id. at 462 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court specifically noted
that the government does not need property owners’ consent to impose taxes. Id. The
North Dakota Supreme Court used similar analysis in Federal Farm Mortgage Corp. v. Falk
twelve years later, invalidating an amended version of the indemnity hail tax statute. 270
N.W. 885 (N.D. 1937). The court once again struck down the program, finding that it was
neither a valid tax nor a valid assessment. Id. at 888. The court further reasoned that “the
Legislature cannot, by mere definition, transform an ordinary debt arising out of a contract
into a tax.” Id. at 889.
112
863 So. 2d 138, 145 (Fla. 2003).
113
See id. at 146 (noting that the fee only applies to participating properties and not to
“undeveloped” properties or properties that “implement ways to retain all stormwater on
site”).
114
Id. at 144. The court stated that fees:
[A]re charged in exchange for a particular governmental service which
benefits the party paying the fee in a manner not shared by other
members of society, and they are paid by choice, in that the party
paying the fee has the option of not utilizing the governmental service
and thereby avoiding the charge.
Id. (quoting State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d. 1, 3 (Fla. 1994)).
115
See id. at 145 (listing the factors courts must look at when determining if a program is
an assessment or a fee).
111
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following six elements to qualify as valid property assessments. 116 The
Analysis begins, in Part III.A.1, by addressing the first three elements:
public benefits, local benefits, and benefits conferred to the public at
large.117 Next, Part III.A.2 examines whether PACE assessments only
apply to property receiving benefits. 118 After that, Part III.A.3 addresses
whether the PACE assessment is proportional to the value of the
property and to other assessments.119 The consent element is examined
in Part III.A.4 to determine whether PACE programs can be imposed
without the owner’s consent.120 Part III.B.1 reveals that PACE programs
do not satisfy several of these elements, so local governments cannot
impose senior liens on participating properties under their assessment
authority.121 Finally, Part III.B.2 evaluates proposed resolutions to the
PACE controversy and concludes that none of these solutions adequately
resolves the dispute.122
A. PACE Programs do not Fulfill the Requirements of Assessment Districts
A valid property assessment must include several elements: it must
be for a public purpose, provide a local improvement, and benefit the
public at large.123 Next, the property assessment lien must only be
applied to properties in the specific geographic area receiving the
benefit.124 Also, the cost of the assessment to the homeowner must be
proportional to the value of the assessed property.125 Finally, the
municipality does not need to obtain a homeowner’s consent before
See supra Part II.D (listing the elements for an assessment).
See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing whether PACE programs provide public benefits to
the specific area assessed instead of private benefits).
118
See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing whether the program applies to all residents in an
area).
119
See infra Part III.A.3 (analyzing whether the assessment is proportional to the value of
the property and to other liens on the assessed property).
120
See infra Part III.A.4 (analyzing whether these programs are voluntary).
121
See infra Part III.B.1 (explaining that local governments can only impose senior liens
under their assessment authority if the program meets all the requirements of a valid
assessment).
122
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the effectiveness of solutions currently being proposed
by supporters and opponents of PACE programs).
123
See supra note 91 (explaining that property assessments can only finance projects that
result in public benefits to the community at large and not projects that primarily benefit
private individuals).
124
See supra note 92 (explaining that local governments can only apply assessments to
properties that are benefited from the improvement and explaining the policy rationale
behind this requirement).
125
See supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text (explaining the proportionality
requirement and also describing various ways of measuring an assessment’s
proportionality).
116
117
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imposing a property assessment.126 If a program satisfies each of these
elements, the program qualifies as a property assessment, and the
municipality can validly impose a senior lien on the assessed
properties.127 PACE programs meet few of these elements because they
have unique features, which distinguish them from traditional property
assessments.
1.

PACE Programs Serve a Public Purpose and Confer Local Benefits to
the Public at Large

At the threshold level, PACE programs must be for a public purpose
and provide benefits both to the public at large and to the assessed
property.128 Property assessments have financed many different types of
public projects, and many early cases upheld a local government’s ability
to finance projects ranging from road and sidewalk improvements to the
construction of public docks using property assessments. 129 More
recently, municipalities have used property assessments to finance
improvements on private property. 130 Cities in California finance seismic
retrofits on buildings to make them more resistant to earthquakes, and
Massachusetts replaces property owners’ septic tanks using assessments
with optional senior lien provisions.131
In the above examples, the public benefits of improved roads,
sidewalks, and new docks are clear: residents are able to travel with
greater ease; however, courts have limited such projects to public
projects.132 Both California and Massachusetts provide public benefits
beyond that of property improvements. When buildings receive
126
See supra notes 107–15 (explaining that assessments cannot depend on the consent of
homeowners).
127
See supra notes 86–87 (explaining that local governments can make assessment liens
senior to all preexisting mortgages and liens under its assessment authority).
128
See supra notes 91–92 and accompanying text (listing the elements of an assessment
and explaining the public purpose and public benefit elements).
129
See COUGHLIN ET AL., supra note 19, at 2 (noting that local governments often use
special assessments to finance road improvements, “bury[] power lines, [and] extend[]
public services into neighborhoods”).
130
See generally supra note 80 (listing types of improvements to private property,
including “seismic improvements, geologic hazard abatement and . . . septic tank
replacement”).
131
See FREE LIBRARY, supra note 80 (reporting on the California Infrastructure and
Economic Development Bank Bay Area’s Toll Bridge’s plan to make two bond issues, one
with a senior lien priority and one with a junior lien priority to finance bridge upgrades);
MASS. DEP’T ENVTL. PROTECTION, supra note 31 (describing Betterment agreements that
allow homeowners to obtain financing from local governments for septic replacements).
The Bay Area Plan’s second lien priority is significant because it shows that junior liens are
a feasible means of raising revenue. FREE LIBRARY, supra note 80.
132
See supra notes 90–91 (describing the distinction between public and private benefits).
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upgrades, those buildings will sustain less damage in an earthquake and
reduce property damage to the community as a whole. 133 Furthermore,
septic tank improvements would reduce the danger of sewage leaching
into the land and polluting neighboring residents’ water supplies. 134
Although the above mentioned benefits are undisputed, the public
benefits resulting from PACE programs are less clear. For instance,
proponents claim that PACE programs will benefit individual property
owners by improving the exact value of their property and reducing
utility bills, which is a dubious claim at best, because no one can
accurately predict the value of a home until the property is sold. 135
Nonetheless, PACE proponents assert that individuals looking to buy a
house will be more willing to buy an energy-efficient home with solar
panels and will pay more for these houses than for comparable houses
without solar panels.136 Homeowners would certainly like to sell their
homes for more money, but benefits based on projected increases in
property values are not likely to survive judicial scrutiny because
benefits cannot be based on mere conjecture. 137 Improvements to
increase property values seem to be private improvements, like the
proposed construction of a private dock in Hamilton v. Portland Pier Site
See supra note 31 (discussing seismic upgrades in California).
See supra note 31 (discussing septic tank replacement in Massachusetts).
135
See ZIMRING & FULLER, supra note 4, at 3 (“[E]nergy savings [from solar panel
installation] will offset and, in some cases, exceed the assessment payments,” thereby
reducing the risk of default on the PACE assessment); NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note
33, at 4 (claiming that PACE programs will give homeowners more disposable income
since “lower utility bills offset the cost of the assessment”). But see Cent. Sav. Bank v. City
of New York, 18 N.E.2d 151, 155–56 (N.Y. 1938) (noting that expenditures “may or may not
add anything to the land value, and on foreclosure sale might not bring one penny more to
the mortgagee”); Felt, supra note 7, at 9 (arguing that since “the entire balance of the loan
remains as an encumbrance on the property, continuing to impair the value of the
mortgagee’s collateral and lowering the amount available to mortgagees in a
foreclosure . . . or other resolution of defaulting mortgage” the claim that PACE programs
improve the value of property is highly suspect).
136
See ELKIND ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (asserting that solar panels would increase
demand for homes and homes would sell for more money than comparable houses without
solar panels). But see Felt, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining that projected increases in property
values are speculative because these “improvements do not increase the value of property
dollar for dollar”). Projected increases in property values are suspect for another reason: if
homeowners do not maintain and repair their solar panels, these improvements might be
“worthless long before the PACE loan is paid.” Id.
137
See supra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining that assessments do not need to
directly benefit the property, but should be based on something other than projected
increases in fair market value); see also Kansas City S. Ry. Co. v. Road Improvement Dist.
No. 3, 266 U.S. 379, 387–88 (1924) (explaining that assessments can be “based on a solid
premise of fact and experience,” but not on “mere speculation and conjecture”). In Kansas
City Southern Railway Co., the U.S. Supreme Court upheld an assessment because the
benefits were based on reasonable increases in railroad traffic. Id. at 388.
133
134
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District.138 Homeowners can enjoy the same “right to the exclusive
enjoyment of the structure” as the dock owners in Hamilton.139 The
Maine Supreme Court found that justification insufficient, and a court
would likely find the same justification insufficient as applied to PACE
programs.
PACE supporters also assert that solar retrofits financed through
PACE programs benefit the environment as a whole, because clean
energy, such as solar power, reduces the nation’s dependence on fossil
fuels, which in turn reduces greenhouse gas emissions and global
warming.140 A court might find combating global warming to be a
public benefit, even though the benefit is more tenuous than street
improvements or seismic upgrades, because courts give great deference
to legislative findings of public benefits when those benefits are based on
measurable criteria.141
In addition to serving a public purpose and providing a public
benefit, PACE programs must provide a local benefit to constitute a valid
property assessment.142 The benefit can come in the form of any of the
benefits mentioned in Part III.B.1, but it must specifically apply to the
properties in the assessed district. 143 PACE programs do not meet these
requirements. Although they provide jobs for local construction
companies and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in local communities,
these benefits are not specific to the properties assessed; they benefit the

In Hamilton, the Maine Supreme Court invalidated a plan to finance a private dock
because the owners of the dock enjoyed exclusive access to the dock. 112 A. 836, 840 (Me.
1921). Similarly, PACE programs finance private improvements because homeowners
enjoy exclusive access to their home. Id.
139
Id.
140
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 2 and accompanying text (explaining that PACE
programs can reduce greenhouse gas emissions and combat global warming).
141
See Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 266 U.S. at 388 (upholding an assessment with an indirect
benefit because that benefit was calculated based on “forecast and estimate”). Decreases in
greenhouse gas emissions, and a resulting reduction in global warming are indirectly
related to PACE programs, but these benefits are calculated based on forecasts and
estimates of reductions. Id. Therefore, the global warming rationale would likely fall
within Kansas City Southern Railway Co.’s “forecast and estimate” standard and be upheld.
Id.
142
See City of Whittier v. Dixon, 151 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1944) (holding that “a special
assessment is justified if the improvement is a public one and the property to be assessed will
receive a special benefit”) (emphasis added); Irish v. Hahn, 281 P. 385, 387 (Cal. 1929) (noting
that one of the limitations on a municipality’s assessment power is “that the
improvement . . . must confer a special benefit upon the property assessed”).
143
See supra notes 90–91 (explaining that to meet the public purpose requirement,
assessments must benefit the public within the assessment district and confer a specific
benefit on the assessed property).
138
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community as a whole.144 Homeowners who otherwise would not be
able to finance these improvements are able to obtain financing through
PACE programs, but this benefit fails the public benefit requirement so it
cannot be used as a justification. 145 For these reasons, courts would
likely find that PACE programs do not serve a public purpose or provide
a local benefit to the public at large.146 The remaining elements do not
fare any better.
2.

PACE Assessments do not Apply to All Properties in a Distinct
Geographic Area

Typical property assessments, or special assessments, are only
applied to residents living in a distinct geographic area receiving the
benefit of the assessment.147 For example, if a local government widens
A Street, the local government can impose a special assessment on all

See supra note 91 (explaining that special assessments may incidentally benefit the
community at large as long as it primarily benefits the assessed property and as long as the
local benefit is distinguished from the general benefit); see also NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL,
supra note 33, at 3 (claiming that PACE programs can lead to “[s]ignificant job creation”
because even “[m]odest implementation nationally for PACE financing of solar PV and
energy efficiency retrofits can create about 160,000 long-term, green jobs for our
economy . . . in the communities that adopt PACE”). Additionally, according to PACE
supporters, these programs can lead to a “[s]ubstantial reduction in greenhouse gas
emissions” because “[a] standard retrofit package in an individual home can reduce CO 2
emissions by 60–100 tons over its useful life.” Id. Global warming is being blamed for
“melting glaciers, droughts, [and] plumes of jellyfish devastating fisheries, . . . dramatic
wildfires plaguing much of the West and drought affecting large swaths of the Southeast
and West.” DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3.
145
See NAT’L RES. DEF. COUNCIL, supra note 33, at 4 (noting that PACE programs are
available to “[m]any segments of society that are underserved by traditional financial
options”). PACE supporters also claim that “PACE can be a smart choice for homeowners
of all income levels.” Id. However, PACE supporters are quick to note that homeowners of
all income levels can benefit from PACE programs, which they allege minimizes the risks
to mortgage holders of moral hazard and adverse selection. Id. They claim that “[a]dverse
selection would occur if, out of the pool of potential participants, only the weakest and
most likely to go delinquent would apply.” Id. “Moral hazard would occur if, either
directly or indirectly, participation in the program would actually increase the likelihood of
nonpayment.” Id.
146
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 3 (noting that “courts defer to legislative bodies
in their declaration of a public purpose” and that courts have broadly defined public
purposes).
147
See supra note 92 (explaining that assessments can only apply to property receiving the
benefit and citing relevant case law for this proposition). For instance, the property must
be either “actually or presumptively” benefited to be included in the assessment district,
but “the property can be presumed to have received an especial benefit.” Halsted v.
Sacramento, 52 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (emphasis omitted).
144
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residents living on A Street.148 Conversely, the government cannot
impose the assessment on residents of Z Street on the other side of town
because those residents are not living within the assessment district. 149
However, if the program applies on a house-by-house basis depending
on whether the property owners opt in, the program is more like a fee
than an assessment.150 PACE assessments only apply to residents who
take part in the program, regardless of where they live. 151 PACE
programs are different from normal assessment programs because
residents in the PACE assessment district do not necessarily live along
one street or on one city block.152 Residents are included in the PACE
assessment district on a house-by-house basis, rather than a block-byblock or street-by-street basis.153 This means that PACE programs are
more like fees than special assessments.154
3.

The Value of the Improvement is Proportional to the Property’s
Value

The value of property assessments must be proportional to both the
value of the property and to other assessments on the property. 155 In
See Halsted, 52 Cal. Rptr. at 642 (explaining that the assessments can only be levied on
houses that benefit from the improvement).
149
See also STONE & YOUNGBERG, supra note 81 (explaining that municipalities create
assessment districts in a certain portion of the city and the district encompasses houses
within that portion of the city).
150
See supra notes 114–15 (explaining the distinction between fees and assessments).
151
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that “PACE programs are entirely
voluntary” and therefore the programs do not apply to residents who choose not to “opt-in”
to the program) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted); FULLER, supra note
29, at 27 (explaining that property is not assessed unless the “owner ‘opts-in’”).
152
See generally FULLER, supra note 29, at 27 (comparing typical assessment districts where
“the governing body must designate the geographic boundaries of the district, and all
parcels of property on the tax roll for such designated area are included in the district”
with PACE assessment districts, which require property owners to opt-into the program
before becoming part of the assessment district).
153
See supra note 24 (explaining that since PACE programs are voluntary, individual
households determine whether they want to voluntarily opt into the program); cf. German
Sav. & Loan Soc’y v. Ramish, 69 P. 89, 91 (Cal. 1902) (holding that all residents on the street
are required to be members of the assessment district). For purposes of this element, the
distinction between a house-by-house assessment and a block-by-block assessment is
immaterial because the assessment district only consists of residents who receive the
program’s benefits. Id.
154
See supra note 115 (explaining that fees apply only to property owners who opt into a
program while assessments apply to all residents in a given district).
155
See WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (explaining that the assessment must be proportionate
not only to the benefit conferred on the property, but also must be “proportionate to other
property assessments”); see also Gast Realty & Inv. Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S.
55, 59 (1916) (explaining that an assessment is invalid if “the parties will be taxed
148
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other words, the assessment typically cannot account for more than a
particular percentage of the property’s value. 156 This requirement has
strong practical considerations because a lien on a property, whether
arising from an assessment or a loan, is difficult to pay off if it is worth
more than a small percentage of the property.157
PACE programs that adhere to the DOE’s Best Practices Guidelines
also have strict loan limits.158 The Guidelines specifically suggest that
PACE assessments not account for more than ten percent of the
property’s value.159 These DOE Guidelines satisfy the proportionality
requirement for property assessments, and provide more protection than
is typically required by case law.160 While PACE programs satisfy the
proportionality requirement, they fail the consent element.161
disproportionately to each other and to the benefit conferred”); Houck v. Little River
Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 265 (1915) (“The state in its discretion may lay such
assessments in proportion to position, frontage, area, market value, or to benefits estimated
by commissioners.”); Martin, 205 U.S. at 140 (explaining that an assessment statute is valid
if “the apportionment is . . . limited to the benefit”). Courts have upheld various formulae
used to calculate proportionality. Id.
156
See WHITE, supra note 6, at 16 (explaining that statutes often contain “express
limitations” mandating that the burden “shall not exceed” a certain percentage of the
property’s value). Often, property assessments cannot account for more than twenty-five
percent of a property’s value, though some case authority allows assessments to account
for as much as seventy-five percent of the property’s value. MCQUILLIN, supra note 86; see
also supra note 96 (providing case law for twenty, twenty-five, and forty percent limits).
157
See STONE & YOUNGBERG, supra note 81 (advising potential investors on how to invest
in municipal investment bonds).
158
See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30 (setting forth suggested loan guidelines to
ensure that PACE loans offer more protection to preexisting mortgage holders).
159
See id. at 3 (suggesting that “PACE assessments should generally not exceed 10% of
property’s estimated value (i.e. a property value-to-lien ratio of 10:1”)). The Guidelines
further recommend that “assessments should . . . not be issued for projects below a
minimum cost threshold of approximately $2500 [to] . . . ensure that improvements are
‘right-sized’ for properties and for the administrative costs of . . . PACE programs.” Id.
Opponents counter that these protections are not adequate because PACE liens still
subordinate preexisting mortgages and interests, which lowers the value of those interests.
Felt, supra note 7, at 3. PACE loans increase the LTV ratio of the first mortgage. Id. The
LTV “is the ratio of the amount of the mortgage loan to the value of the home that provides
collateral. The higher the LTV, the less valuable is the mortgage. . . . [E]very PACE loan
that is made on a mortgaged property will” substantially decrease the value of preexisting
mortgages. Id.
160
See DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 30, at 3 (urging ten percent limits on PACE
assessments); cf. Withrow v. City of Nashville, 224 S.W. 614, 614 (Ark. 1920) (allowing a
twenty percent limit); City St. Improvement Co. v. Quigley, 215 P. 390, 391 (Cal. 1923)
(allowing a fifty percent limit); Uhlenhake v. City of Ossian, 418 N.W.2d 642, 648 (Iowa
1988) (allowing a twenty-five percent limit); Ward v. City of Louisville, 138 S.W.2d 461, 462
(Ky. 1940) (allowing a seventy-five percent limit); In re Local Improvement Dist. 417, 268 P.
164, 166 (Wash. 1928) (allowing a forty percent limit).
161
See supra notes 90–98 and accompanying text (describing the elements of valid
property assessments).
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PACE Programs Fail the Consent Element

PACE programs do not satisfy the final requirement either because
they require the property owner’s consent. 162 Early cases clearly
establish that property assessments cannot be dependent on the property
owner’s consent.163 In other words, if a property owner must consent to
an “assessment,” the program must be classified as a loan or a fee. 164
PACE proponents correctly analogize PACE programs to the voluntary
Massachusetts septic tank replacement programs. 165 However, these
programs have not been challenged in court, so there is no case law
upholding their voluntary nature.166 PACE programs are more like fees
than assessments because they only apply to homeowners who
participate.167 The only case law dealing with voluntary property
assessment programs strikes down those programs, and PACE programs

See supra notes 90–98 (listing the elements of a valid property assessment).
See Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459, 463–64 (N.D. 1925) (analyzing the validity of
voluntary “assessments”). In Davis, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that a voluntary
indemnity insurance program was not a valid tax because residents could voluntarily optinto the program. Id. at 463. In a subsequent case, the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that an amended program could not be classified as a property assessment with senior lien
provisions, again because the program was voluntary. Fed. Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Falk, 270
N.W. 885, 889 (N.D. 1937). These invalid hail insurance programs are analogous to PACE
programs since both programs allow property owners to decide whether they want to take
part in the program. Id.
164
See Halsted v. Sacramento, 52 Cal. Rptr. 637, 642 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (“[T]he public,
acting through its government, may construct [the improvement] without the consent of
the particular individuals affected.”). If this element is absent, the program “is essentially a
private improvement” and the local government cannot use its property assessment
authority to finance the improvement “no matter how useful or advantageous it may be” to
the property owners. Id.
165
See MASS. DEP’T ENVTL. PROT., supra note 31 (describing the requirements of
Betterment Agreements). Like PACE programs, Betterment Agreements are “[f]inancial
[a]greement[s] between a homeowner and the community.” Id. Also like PACE programs,
the local government pays the upfront costs of septic improvements and the homeowner
repays the local government through a line item on the property tax. Id. Finally, if the
homeowner does not repay the loan, the local government may obtain a senior “municipal
lien” on the property to obtain repayment from the homeowner. Id. In all relevant aspects,
Massachusetts’s Betterment Agreements are identical to PACE programs. See supra notes
23–37 and accompanying text (describing the features of PACE programs).
166
The author utilized a Westlaw and Lexis search using the terms “Betterment
Agreement!” and lien on October 22, 2011. This search retrieved no cases. The author ran
this search to find any cases challenging the legal authority of Massachusetts’ Betterment
Agreements, but because he found no cases, it appears these programs have not been
challenged yet.
167
See supra notes 114–15 (comparing assessments to the fee programs in City of
Gainesville).
162
163
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would likely suffer a similar fate.168 According to PACE proponents, a
major selling point of the program is its voluntary nature, but this
provision will ultimately be PACE programs’ undoing.169
B. PACE Programs do not Meet the Requirements for Valid Assessments
As the above analysis indicates, PACE programs fail to satisfy
several elements; thus, they cannot be classified as property assessments
with senior lien provisions.170 PACE programs meet the proportionality
requirement because the assessment value is proportional to the value of
the property.171 They also arguably serve a public purpose, but they
benefit private individuals instead of providing a local benefit for the
public.172 PACE liens are only applied to property if the property owner
participates in the program, not to all properties in a distinct geographic
area.173 However, the programs also fail the test for a valid assessment,
because PACE statutes expressly require that the programs be
voluntary.174
Well-settled case law establishes the principle that
programs requiring property owners’ consent cannot be labeled property
assessments with senior lien provisions. 175 As such, PACE programs
See supra notes 107–15 (explaining the reasons for invalidating voluntary programs in
Davis and City of Gainesville).
169
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 4 (explaining that PACE programs benefit from
the voluntary lien provisions because homeowners who do not wish to take part in the
program are not burdened in any way).
170
See supra note 97 (explaining that assessments cannot turn on a property owner’s
consent). PACE proponents argue that PACE programs are not the only examples of
voluntary assessments, saying that “in California, land-secured financing districts are
commonly used by land developers, who voluntarily assess their undeveloped property to
finance the public improvements.” DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 5. However,
voluntarily creating a district is distinct from voluntarily opting into or out of a district. Id.
Indeed, in German Savings & Loan Society v. Ramish, the court noted that the residents who
opposed the district could have voiced their opposition before the city created the district
and could have prevented the city from creating the district. 69 P. 89, 92 (Cal. 1902).
171
See supra Part III.A.3 (explaining that PACE programs are proportional to the value of
the assessed property and to other liens on that property, thus satisfying this requirement
for a valid assessment).
172
See supra Part III.A.1 (explaining that, while a court might find PACE programs are for
a public purpose, they will find that the programs do not provide a local benefit and
instead benefit the general public).
173
See supra Part III.A.2 (explaining that PACE programs apply only to property if the
owner opts into the program, and not to all properties in the area).
174
See supra Part III.A.4 (explaining that PACE programs are strictly voluntary, thus
failing the requirement that assessments not be voluntary).
175
See supra notes 107–11 and accompanying text (stating that property taxes are not
voluntary; rather a property tax must be imposed by the government without the owner’s
consent, as explained in Davis v. McLean County); see also Fed. Farm Mortg. Corp. v. Falk,
270 N.W. 885, 889 (N.D. 1937) (explaining that voluntary programs with senior lien
repayment provisions exceed a local government’s assessment authority and are invalid).
168
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cannot impose a senior lien on participating properties under the guise
of a property assessment or special assessment. 176
1.

Voluntary PACE Loans Cannot Receive Senior Tax Lien Status

The “first in time, first in right” principle is the general rule
governing mortgages, where the first mortgage or lien on a property
receives senior lien status; however, there are several exceptions to this
general rule.177 Local governments can make tax or assessment liens
senior to all other preexisting or subsequent liens. 178 This exception is
justified because local governments must be able to receive money owed
to them by property owners in the event of a default, because the local
Other
government finances projects of general public benefit.179
taxpayers and residents should not be left financing the portion of a
public project that a delinquent property owner should have paid. 180
This policy rationale does not extend to private loans, even if those
private loans are obtained through the local government for an
ostensibly public purpose, like PACE projects. 181 Private loans must
generally adhere to the “first in time, first in right” principle. 182 As such,
property owners can freely opt into PACE programs, but they must do
so under the assumption that the PACE lien will be junior and
subordinate to any preexisting mortgages and liens.183 The majority of
See supra notes 163–69 (analyzing the essential consent requirement of property
assessments, and concluding that PACE programs ultimately fail this requirement).
177
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining that the “first in time first in
right” principle is the general rule and as a result, earlier mortgages and property interests
receive priority over subsequent property interests). But see supra note 84 (explaining that
this general rule is subject to a “multitude of limitations”).
178
See MCQUILLIN, supra note 86, § 44.142 (explaining that the general legislative policy
has been to regard municipal taxes as liens superior in point of payment to all other liens);
supra notes 86–87 (explaining that the legislature has the full power to set tax lien priorities,
and can legitimately make these liens superior to all prior property interests).
179
See supra note 87 (explaining the policy rationale behind senior tax liens).
180
See WHITE, supra note 6, at 8 (offering perhaps the best example of residents being
forced to repay bonds that should have been repaid by another entity). Municipalities
aided railroads by financing railroad improvements through bond issues, but mismanaged
railroads went out of business and taxpayers were left repaying the bond long after the
railroad’s benefits were gone. Id.
181
See supra note 87 (explaining that tax liens receive a senior lien status to ensure that
local governments can finance their operations). The North Dakota Supreme Court
reasoned that if a program is not a tax, “then the [l]egislature cannot, by designating it as a
tax, give it any greater preference as a lien than could be given it should no such name be
affixed to it.” Davis v. McLean Cnty., 204 N.W. 459, 464 (N.D. 1925).
182
See supra note 84 (explaining that although the “first in time, first in right” principle is
“subject to a ‘multitude of limitations,’” it is the “general rule”).
183
See supra note 84 (explaining that the “first in time, first in right” principle is the basic
rule governing mortgage seniority).
176
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PACE statutes instead allow local governments to impose senior liens to
ensure payback of these voluntary loans, which has led to the dispute
between PACE proponents and the GSEs. 184
2.

No Proposed Solution Adequately Addresses the Concerns of All
Stakeholders

The simple solution to the lien seniority problem appears to be the
one advocated by the GSEs: amend the state statutes to make PACE
liens junior and subordinate to preexisting property interests, including
mortgages.185 This solution would be relatively simple to implement—
state legislatures would essentially strike one phrase, or sometimes even
one word, from state statutes. However, this seemingly simple solution
would open up more problems from a practical standpoint.
For example, once PACE programs implement a junior lien
repayment provision, PACE bonds, which raise the initial capital for the
solar energy retrofits, will drop from AAA status to junk bond status. 186
PACE supporters argue that this change will cause investors to shy away
from PACE bonds as an investment tool. 187 Although this distinction
would not affect the legality of PACE programs, it would create
significant financial barriers.188 For instance, if investors shy away from
PACE programs with junior lien repayment provisions, PACE programs
will likely remain unfunded, and the programs’ many environmental
benefits will continue to go unrealized. 189 This is certainly not a viable
See supra note 38 and accompanying text (explaining that most state statutes impose a
senior lien repayment provision); supra note 40 and accompanying text (explaining that
Maine’s statute is the one notable exception to the senior lien repayment method because
Maine’s statute specifically requires a subordinate lien repayment system); see also supra
note 36 (listing statutes, including Wisconsin’s statute, which describe PACE programs as
loans); supra note 34 (listing statutes that specifically mention the voluntary nature of these
programs).
185
See supra notes 41–44 (reporting the GSEs’ requests that PACE loans achieve a
subordinate lien status).
186
See supra note 80 (explaining that the difference between AAA bonds and junk bonds
is based on the bond’s repayment provisions).
187
See supra note 81 (explaining why investors will hesitate to invest in junk bonds with
junior lien repayment provisions); see also Barclay’s Letter, supra note 83 (applying these
concerns to PACE bonds). According to Barclay’s Capital, PACE bonds will not be an
attractive investment if they have subordinate lien provisions because they will not be
investment grade. Id.
188
See supra note 81 (explaining that since investors will hesitate to invest in junk bonds,
PACE programs are likely to go unfunded).
189
See DeVries & Lynch, supra note 5, at 7 (explaining that local governments will not be
able to raise enough revenue to fund solar retrofits if PACE programs do not have senior
lien provisions). They go on to claim that if mortgages are senior to PACE liens, ensuring
repayment “would be impracticable if not impossible.” Id.; see also July 14, 2010 FHFA
184
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solution to the PACE issue; even the GSEs point out that they support
measures to help the environment as long as those measures do not
affect their contract rights.190
Once a decision is announced in California ex rel Brown v. FHFA, all
interested parties will have a better idea whether PACE programs
constitute valid property assessments with senior lien provisions.191
However, the court system moves notoriously slow, as former California
Attorney General Brown acknowledged before filing the case. 192
Furthermore, similar cases have been filed in other circuits, which raises
the possibility of a circuit split on the issue. 193 If that occurs, the
mortgage industry will not have a definitive answer unless the Supreme
Court takes up the issue. In the meantime, the legality of the senior lien
provisions will remain uncertain, and stakeholders will hesitate to invest
in PACE programs.194
Congressional efforts to resolve this issue ultimately proved
unfruitful for the following practical and political reasons. As a practical
matter, the bills introduced by Congressman Mike Thompson and
Senator Barbara Boxer sought to amend the GSEs’ lending standards to
encompass programs like PACE.195 This would prevent Fannie Mae,
Freddie Mac, and the FHFA from rejecting home mortgages with PACE
liens, but it would not solve the underlying structural problems caused

Press Release, supra note 43 (claiming that PACE programs are currently dead because of
the legal uncertainty surrounding the senior lien provisions).
190
See July 6, 2010 FHFA Press Release, supra note 8 (reaffirming its commitment “to
work[] with federal, state, and local government agencies to develop and implement
energy retrofit lending programs with appropriate underwriting guidelines and consumer
protection standards”); see also Fannie Mae Letter, supra note 42 (emphasis added) (stating
that Fannie Mae is “willing to engage with federal and state agencies as they consider
sustainable programs to facilitate lending for energy-efficiency home retrofits, while
preserving the status of mortgage loans originated as first liens”); Freddie Mac Letter, supra note
42 (supporting “the goal of encouraging responsible financing of energy efficient and
renewable energy home improvements”).
191
See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (explaining that former California
Attorney General Brown filed suit in federal district court seeking declaratory judgment
against the FHFA to declare that PACE programs are not loans, but rather valid property
assessments and do not violate the FHFA’s lending standards).
192
See supra note 53 (quoting Brown as urging the FHFA to work with California to
resolve the issue before he filed suit because the suit would be more time consuming).
193
See supra note 53 (listing the other cases filed in federal district court).
194
See supra note 55 (explaining that there is uncertainty surrounding PACE programs
and advising potential investors to avoid PACE programs until the legal issues are
resolved).
195
See supra note 61 (quoting the bills, which seek to amend the lending standards to
comply with PACE program requirements as elaborated in the DOE’s Best Practices
Guidelines).
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by PACE programs.196 These programs would still represent another
property interest that could push a homeowner’s mortgage further
underwater and lead to default.197 From a political standpoint, the 111th
Congressional Term is over and neither bill cleared its respective
committee, which means each must be reintroduced in the 112th Term
before it can be voted on. The measures gathered only meager support
from the Democrat-controlled Congress, and will likely gather even less
support now that Republicans control the House of Representatives. 198
Any Congressional resolution, however ineffective, is highly unlikely.
Therefore, the burden of resolving this controversy falls on state
legislatures to amend state statutes in a far more comprehensive manner.
IV. CONTRIBUTION
PACE programs are not valid property assessments, so local
governments cannot use their traditional property assessment authority
to impose senior lien provisions for PACE programs. 199 This means that
PACE statutes must be amended to avoid interfering with mortgagors’
contract rights. 200 State legislatures must strike the senior lien provisions
altogether and adopt a junior lien provision with a loan loss reserve fund
for secondary repayment.
North Carolina and Hawaii have
experimented with this method of repayment for their PACE
programs.201 Although these programs are too new to provide extensive
empirical data as to their effectiveness, Reserve Funds have been used
successfully in similar situations.202
State legislatures must enact a comprehensive PACE reform statute
with multiple structural changes to adequately resolve the PACE
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (explaining that the FHFA objects to PACE
programs because they represent loans without sound underwriting standards).
197
See supra note 74 (describing how PACE loans raise the LTV ratio and could lead to
default).
198
See supra note 65 (noting that the bills have few co-sponsors, and no Republican cosponsors).
199
See supra Part III (analyzing PACE programs and concluding that they are not valid
property assessments with senior lien provisions).
200
For purposes of this Contribution, the relevant portions of Maine’s PACE statute serve
as the basis for the proposed Model PACE Statute with amended provisions in italics. The
relevant portions of Maine’s statute are ME. REV. STAT. tit. 35-A, §§ 10155 and 10156. The
Model Statute keeps the same numbering for clarity’s sake and is cited as MOD. REV. STAT.
tit. 35-A, §§ 10155 and 10156.
201
See supra note 37 (explaining that North Carolina and Hawaii have adopted a
Revolving Loan Fund provision as an alternate method of repayment).
202
See supra note 99 (explaining that Reserve Funds help insure that investors in
assessment bonds receive a return on their investment); see also supra note 5 (explaining that
homeowners often need local government assistance to finance these programs).
196
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controversy. As a preliminary matter, these proposed amendments can
only be applied prospectively and not to preexisting PACE loans. 203
Stringent underwriting and program design requirements to satisfy the
mortgage industry’s concerns are proposed in Part IV.B. 204 Next, states
should create a third-party trust to manage the collection of PACE
loans.205 Furthermore, it is vital that PACE loans follow the “first in time,
first in right” principle, but Part IV.D proposes an optional senior lien
provision if certain requirements are met.206 Finally, the creation of a
loan loss reserve fund is proposed in Part IV.E to ensure that subordinate
PACE loans are fully repaid in the event of a default.207 While these
amendments can resolve the PACE controversy, they cannot apply
retroactively without causing additional problems.
A. All Amendments to PACE Statutes Must Apply Prospectively
The GSEs and the mortgage industry oppose PACE loan programs
because these programs interfere with their contract rights by
subordinating their senior mortgages to PACE loans. 208 If states amend
their PACE statutes to apply to preexisting PACE loans, the statutes will
still interfere with contract rights. This time the PACE statutes will
interfere with the contract rights of people who invested in PACE bonds.
These investors purchased PACE bonds with the expectation that the
PACE liens would be repaid first in a foreclosure and that they would
receive a return on their investment. If existing PACE loans are
subordinated, the investors might not receive a return on their
investment.209
Therefore, the GSEs should agree to honor all PACE loans already in
existence on the condition that all future PACE loans will apply the “first
in time, first in right” principle. The FHFA offered to honor these
See infra Part IV.A (explaining that if amended PACE statutes applied retroactively,
they would impact the contract rights of homeowners who already entered into a PACE
loan).
204
See infra Part IV.B (proposing underwriting criteria that comply with the FHFA’s
lending standards).
205
See infra Part IV.C (proposing that states establish a trust to free local governments
from the burden of collecting PACE loans).
206
See infra Part IV.D (proposing PACE statutes adhere to the “first in time, first in right”
principle).
207
See infra Part IV.E (proposing a loan loss reserve fund to ensure investors get a return
on their investment).
208
See supra note 42 (explaining the concerns of the GSEs and the mortgage industry); see
also supra note 78 (explaining why subordination is disadvantageous to senior mortgage
holders).
209
See supra note 81 (explaining that investors will shy away from bonds with junior
repayment provisions because these bonds are less likely to be repaid).
203
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preexisting loans in July 2010.210 Few people have taken out PACE loans
since July 2010 due to the legal uncertainty surrounding these programs,
so the FHFA would not have to honor many more PACE loans than it
already offered to honor.211
B. PACE Programs Must Adopt Stringent Underwriting and Program
Design Requirements
§ 10155. Consumer underwriting and disclosure
1. Underwriting. A PACE agreement entered into
pursuant to a PACE program must comply with the
underwriting standards of the Federal Housing Finance
Agency. In adopting such rules, the trust shall seek
advice from the consumer credit industry stakeholders.
Underwriting requirements established by the trust
must, at a minimum, comply with the program design and
underwriting requirements set forth in the Department of
Energy’s Best Practices Guidelines.212
The Model Statute incorporates, by reference, the FHFA’s very
stringent underwriting requirements.213 This proposal satisfies the
complaint that PACE programs lack adequate underwriting criteria. 214
One principal FHFA criterion is that no loan can subordinate preexisting
mortgages and liens.215
The Model Statute also incorporates, by reference, the DOE’s Best
Practice Guidelines, which were received favorably by the mortgage
industry.216 These guidelines require PACE programs to essentially pay
for themselves by requiring expected benefits to exceed costs. 217 They
also require that PACE loans are not more than ten percent of the
property’s value, which is substantially less than the percentage allowed
See supra note 44 (reporting on the FHFA’s offer to honor preexisting PACE loans).
See supra note 55 (explaining that the legal uncertainty surrounding PACE programs
has caused investors to hesitate before investing in PACE bonds).
212
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. For
the original text of the Maine statute, see supra note 50. For the DOE guidelines
incorporated in the statute, see supra Part II.B.1.
213
See JASPER, supra note 41, at 7–8 (explaining that the FHFA imposes stringent
guidelines for mortgages it backs).
214
See supra Part II.A.3 (explaining that the GSEs and the mortgage industry oppose
PACE programs because of the lack of sound underwriting standards).
215
See supra note 44 (listing FHFA guidelines).
216
See supra Part II.B.1 (describing the guidelines and their favorable reception in the
mortgage industry).
217
See supra note 50 (noting that the DOE guidelines suggest that loans only be offered
for projects where the costs exceed the benefits).
210
211
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in typical property assessments.218 The FHFA underwriting standards
and DOE Guidelines have the combined effect of ensuring that PACE
loans are only extended for appropriate projects, which reduces the risk
of default.219
C. States Should Allow a Third Party to Collect PACE Loan Revenues
§ 10156. PACE mortgages; collection of PACE
assessments; priority
1. Collection of assessments. PACE assessments do
not constitute a tax or assessment but may be collected by
the Energy Efficiency Trust (“Trust”), a municipality or an
agent designated by the Trust or a municipality in any
manner allowed under the PACE program, consistent
with applicable laws.
A. The Trust is created to provide a uniform method of
collecting PACE loan revenues from participating
property owners and repaying investors in PACE bonds.
B. The Trust will also operate a Loan Loss Reserve Fund
to insure that subordinate PACE loans are fully repaid in
the event of a foreclosure. This Loan Loss Reserve Fund
may be funded through the general funds of
municipalities with PACE programs or from various state
and federal grants and loans.220
PACE supporters argue that PACE loans must have a senior lien
provision because local governments have no other effective means of
collecting money from the liens.221 However, another collection method
is needed because local governments cannot make PACE loans senior to
218
Cf. supra note 96 (listing approved percentages ranging from twenty-five percent to
seventy-five percent).
219
See supra note 74 (explaining that property owners with high LTV ratios are likely to
foreclose on their property). The DOE guidelines help solve this problem because they
limit the amount of debt a property owner can take on when the property owner receives a
PACE loan. See supra Part II.B.1 (explaining how the DOE guidelines provide this
protection); see also supra note 41 (asserting that the FHFA requires property owners to
meet stringent guidelines before receiving a loan to guard against the risk of foreclosure).
Incorporating the DOE and FHFA guidelines means that only very safe PACE loans will be
extended.
220
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. For
the original text of the Maine statute’s collection provision, see supra note 37.
221
The argument is questionable because municipalities use other means such as fees to
collect revenues for improvement projects. See City of Gainesville v. Florida, 863 So. 2d
138, 145 (Fla. 2003). Nevertheless, the concern should be addressed in the Model Statute to
ensure an acceptable compromise for all stakeholders.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 46, No. 1 [2011], Art. 8

306

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

other property interests. The collection process should be taken out of
the hands of local governments altogether to free up valuable municipal
resources for other purposes.
States should establish an Energy Efficiency Trust (“Trust”) to
administer PACE loan collection. This is a classic example of tax
farming, which has become increasingly popular in recent years.222 The
Trust also has the benefit of economies of scale—as a state-wide
organization it is larger than a municipal collection entity and therefore
has more resources at its disposal. 223 The Trust operates a Reserve Fund
to pay off PACE liens. This ensures that PACE liens will be fully repaid
even though they are junior property interests. This insurance should
help relieve investors’ concerns about repayment and help ensure PACE
programs are fully funded.224
Money for the Reserve Fund can come from the general fund of
participating municipalities. This means it would come from general tax
receipts, not just from property owners who take out PACE loans, so the
larger tax base would ensure that the Reserve Fund receive more funds.
It might also stimulate demand for PACE loans: all property taxpayers
would have skin in the game because they would be funding the PACE
insurance program and therefore might want to get a direct benefit from
their tax dollars.
D. PACE Loans Must Follow the “First in Time, First in Right” Principle
§ 10156. PACE mortgages; collection of PACE
assessments; priority
....
3. Priority. Except as provided in paragraph A, the
priority of a PACE mortgage created under subsection 2
is determined based on the date of filing of notice
required under subsection 2 and applicable law.
A. A PACE mortgage is not entitled to any special priority
unless paragraph B is applicable.
B. The PACE loan may constitute a senior lien upon the
property on the same level as a property tax assessment only if
the property owner agrees in writing to the payment of the

See supra note 88 (explaining the process of tax farming and its benefits to local
governments).
223
See supra note 99 (explaining that loan loss reserve funds achieve economies of scale).
224
See supra note 81 (explaining that investors will not invest in bonds with junior lien
repayment provisions, which means that PACE programs with junior lien repayment
provisions will go unfunded).
222
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PACE loan in a manner acceptable to the preexisting
mortgage lender or lien holder.225
Since PACE loans are merely loans for home improvements, they
must follow the traditional “first in time, first in right” principle. 226 This
is not a departure from Maine’s statute, because Maine already requires
PACE loans to be junior to preexisting property interests. 227 It is a drastic
change from the majority position, however, because Maine is the only
state to require PACE loans to follow the “first in time, first in right”
principle.228
The Model Statute allows for a minor exception to the “first in time,
first in right” principle because PACE loans resemble property
assessments in some aspects. This exception is particularly appropriate
if states require their local governments to administer loan collection
instead of the proposed Trust. The exception allows PACE loans to hold
a senior lien position, just like valid assessments, if mortgage lenders
agree in writing to the lien seniority.
The exception is justified because it requires the parties to negotiate
for the lien seniority. The mortgage lender will agree to the change only
after receiving some bargained-for exchange. Presumably, lenders will
only agree to such a change in seniority if they feel confident that the
property owners will not default on their PACE loan. This encourages
property owners to only take on reliable PACE programs.
E. States Must Create a Reserve Fund to Ensure PACE Loans are Repaid
§ 10156. PACE mortgages; collection of PACE
assessments; priority.
....
6. Loan Loss Reserve Fund. The Trust shall create a loan
loss reserve fund to protect the trust in the event of a
judicial sale or foreclosure of qualifying property subject
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. For
the text of the original Maine statute, see supra note 40.
226
See supra note 84 (explaining that the “first in time, first in right” principle is the
general rule for lien seniority unless the lien falls within an exception to the rule). PACE
programs do not fall within the exception for property taxes or assessments, and therefore
must follow the “first in time, first in right” principle. See supra Part III.A.4 (analyzing
PACE statutes and concluding that they do not fall within the property tax or assessment
exception).
227
See supra text accompanying note 40 (explaining that the Maine statute is the only
statute with such a provision).
228
See supra text accompanying note 38 (explaining that while some states do not specify
the seniority of PACE loans, most states require senior lien provisions).
225
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to a PACE mortgage. The Reserve Fund is to be used to
satisfy junior PACE liens that cannot be satisfied when a
senior mortgage is foreclosed. The Reserve Fund must be
funded subject to the provisions in section 10156 1.A. at a
level sufficient to offset past due balances on PACE
assessments and any remaining principal balances on
those assessments, as reasonably predicted based on
good lending practices.229
The Reserve Fund shall only be used for PACE loans that represent
junior property interests.230 The Reserve Fund is not needed when the
parties negotiate for a senior PACE lien position because the senior
position guarantees PACE loans will be repaid.231 The Reserve Fund will
only come into play when the PACE loan is junior to a foreclosed
property interest, and PACE investors risk not receiving a return on their
investment. The Reserve Fund will also not release money if there is
enough surplus from the foreclosure to satisfy the PACE loan.
The Trust is also required to maintain an adequate amount of money
in the Reserve Fund to cover all outstanding PACE loans. This means
that the Reserve Funds will satisfy the entire PACE loan, not just the
amount due at the time of foreclosure. When the property is sold to
subsequent property owners, the property will transfer free of any
encumbrances.
V. CONCLUSION
Government programs, like PACE programs, represent a serious
effort to combat global warming and should be encouraged whenever
possible. However, PACE programs also have significant unintended
consequences that could cause the United States housing market to once
again experience the painful recession that began in 2008. 232 That
recession began in part because homeowners were using their homes as
collateral while taking on inappropriate levels of debt.233 PACE
The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contribution of the author. For
examples of an existing Revolving Loan Fund statute, see supra note 37.
230
See supra Part IV.C (discussing the proposed Reserve Fund).
231
See supra notes 74–75 (explaining that senior liens are paid off first in foreclosure and
junior liens are only repaid if there is a surplus after the senior liens are repaid); see also
supra Part IV.D (explaining how the proposed statute is designed to foster negotiations
among the parties and ultimately lead to more feasible PACE projects).
232
See supra note 7 (explaining how PACE statutes as currently codified could risk
repeating the mortgage meltdown of 2008).
233
See supra note 7 (explaining that the recent recession started because of problems with
mortgage lending policies). Homeowners’ property became too highly leveraged and
229
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programs potentially enable homeowners to take on inappropriate debt
levels and even make that debt senior to preexisting mortgages. PACE
programs must be amended because of their ability to increase a
property’s debt load and because of their interference with preexisting
contract rights.
To date, none of the solutions to the PACE controversy proposed by
PACE supporters or mortgage industry groups adequately resolve the
problem, so a new solution must be proposed. The solution must
require PACE loans to follow the “first in time, first in right” principle
and provide adequate safeguards to ensure that investors get a return on
their investment. This solution addresses the two main competing
concerns and would allow PACE programs to become a successful
option for homeowners looking to reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions. Any other solution will, at minimum, slow the “pace” of our
nation’s recovery.
Jonathan R. Sichtermann*

property owners defaulted on their mortgages. See supra note 74 (explaining the problems
with high LTV ratios).
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